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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation builds upon a 25-year old study by Mizrahi and Rosenthal 
(1993) which examined how coalition leaders defined and perceived success and failure 
in their respective coalitions. This study replicates the Mizrahi and Rosenthal study by 
returning to participants from the original study and, adapting the original instrument, 
interviewing those participants to examine their perceptions after 25 years has passed.  
Utilizing the same instrument, new coalition leaders from the originally studied coalitions 
which are still intact are also interviewed and their responses are compared against 
responses from leaders of coalitions which have since dissolved.  The current study uses 
basic descriptive analysis for the structured survey items and grounded theory 
methodology for the qualitative analysis of open-ended questions. 
The analysis examines participant responses in the following areas: participant 
information; coalition information; demographic information of working group, board 
and constituency; characterization of coalition; internal and environmental predictors of 
dissolution; political and social climate during dissolution; political forces influencing 
dissolution; events in the lifespan; benefits and drawback of permanency; target 
information; definition of success; internal and environmental predictors of success; 
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goals; strategies and tactics; decision-making processes; modes of communication; 
coalition resources; membership and participation; leadership; and practice wisdom. 
Utilizing organizational, ecological, social capital and collaboration literature and 
theory, indicators of coalition success are reviewed. Specifically, findings from this study 
confirm that coalition success should be defined multi-dimensionally and that coalitions 
should be operationalized as networks more than as organizations. Findings demonstrate 
that coalition success is predicted by the following internal factors: impetus to form and 
coalition purpose; goal-setting, identification of target and strategy; internal resources; 
leadership; power and decision-making; coalition structure; member contributions; 
diversity; and relationships, including dynamics of respect, trust, commitment and 
communication. Additionally, findings demonstrate that coalition success is predicted by 
the following environmental factors: external resource and resource dependence; goal-
setting, identification of target and strategy; relationship with community and degree of 
coupling; and political, fiscal and social climate. Theoretical and practical implications 
for these findings are discussed along with limitations to current research and areas for 
potential future research. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
Across time and geography, people are driven toward collaboration and other 
types of collective vehicles for change. People seem to find the value in collective action, 
in particular for issues that involve social change. From single acts of collective action to 
large scale social movements, there is a tendency toward collaboration. For individuals 
and organizations whose goals involve social change, coalitions and other cross-sector 
forms of collaboration have become increasingly popular mechanisms for social change 
(Butterfoss, 2007). 
For a variety of reasons, coalitions have become a desirable choice for individuals 
and organizations who want to participate in creating social change. First, there is 
growing recognition that the myriad social issues that exist across society do not occur 
independently of one another. The issue of homelessness, for example, is related to fair 
wages and other labor-related issues. It is also related to fair housing, to economic justice, 
to domestic violence, to child welfare, to veteran affairs, to mental health, to substance 
abuse and so on. There is no way to untangle the web of social issues and so for those 
who desire a particular type of social change, there often is recognition that they must 
collaborate across issues in order achieve success for one sector in particular.  
Coalitions have also become a popular model for change in environments where 
there is a perceived lack of resources. For specialized non-profit organizations operating 
in such an environment, goals often cannot be achieved without pooling and exchanging 
time and resources from multiple entities. Coalitions provide a network, structure and 
process for the exchange of these various forms of capital (Macke & Dilly, 2010). 
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In the last few decades something has occurred that created a space ripe for 
collective action – this is and was the parallel process between globalization and the 
proliferation of social media. For the first time in modern history, individuals can 
immediately connect across geographic boundaries to just about anyone. Social media, in 
particular, has created a platform for not only (debatably) free speech, but also for the 
immediate and uncensored broadcast of social grievances and the exchange of ideas that 
may lead to a coalescing around like-minded ideas. Global coalitions have proliferated in 
this environment (Breslin, 2004). 
There is a growing body of evidence to suggest that coalitions and other types of 
collaboration are successful vehicles for social change.  The largest body of evidence of 
demonstrated effectiveness is most prominently around health-related issues – from 
specific disease-related issues to broader issues of public health and service delivery 
(Elliot, Jolin & Walker, 2000; Hagedorn, Paras, Greenwich & Hagopian, 2016; Homhan 
Rochester, Kean & Belle-Isle, 2010; Norris & Pittman, 2000; Page-Reeves, Cruz & 
Davis, 2014; Wyatt, Brady & Maynard, 2013).  Additionally, coalitions appear to be an 
effective vehicle for change around issues related to environmental concerns (Mayer, 
Brown & Morello-Frosch, 2010); education (Corrigan, 2000; McKinley & Phillis, 2008); 
labor and wage concerns (De Graauw, 2015; Lo & Jacobson, 2011, Snarr, 2011); 
domestic violence (Chan, 2012); economic justice (Lowe & Metzger, 2003); elder abuse 
(Brandl, Dyer, Heisler, Otto, Stiegel & Thomas, 2007); teen pregnancy (Clay, Sagrestano 
& Finerman, 2012); and issues of mental health (Santilli, Carroll-Scott & Ickovics, 2016). 
In response, those who fund programs that address these issues are increasingly 
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mandating multi-disciplinary collaboration (Boris, de Leon, Roeger & Nikolova, 2010). 
A great deal of practice wisdom has emerged out of the rising popularity in 
coalitions and other forms of collaboration and the body of related literature. The purpose 
of my dissertation is to contribute to the existing body of knowledge in the following 
ways: 
1) To test and refine aspects of the existing models of coalition success and 
dissolution, examining both internal and environmental variables  
 
2) To refine the definition of coalition, particularly as it compares to other 
forms of collaboration and other types of organization 
 
3) To contribute to the greater theoretical knowledge of coalitions, 
employing organizational, network, social movement and social capital 
theories. 
 
Specifically, findings from this study will confirm that coalition success should be 
defined multi-dimensionally and that coalitions should be operationalized as networks, 
more so than organizations. Findings will also demonstrate that, according to coalition 
leader participants, the success of coalitions is indicated by the following internal factors: 
impetus to form and coalition purpose; goal-setting, identification of target and strategy; 
internal resources; leadership; power and decision-making; coalition structure; member 
contributions; diversity; and relationships, including dynamics of respect, trust, 
commitment and communication. Additionally, findings will demonstrate that the success 
of coalitions is predicted by the following environmental factors: external resource and 
resource dependence; goal-setting, identification of target and strategy; relationship with 
community and degree of coupling; and political, fiscal and social climate. 
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Background: Original Study (Mizrahi and Rosenthal) 
In the late 1980s, Terry Mizrahi, MSW, DSW, and Beth Rosenthal MSW, both 
seasoned social workers, community organizers and academics began to address what at 
the time was a major gap in the literature: understanding how and why coalitions – and in 
particular social change coalitions – succeed and/or fail (Mizrahi and Rosenthal, 1993). 
More specifically, they were interested in understanding the subjective experiences of 
coalition leaders and stakeholders and their perceptions of success and failure. This 
epistemological approach explicitly valued the practice knowledge that organizers and 
coalition leaders had amassed in their collective years of vast experience.  
Methodology. Their endeavor began by convening multiple focus groups 
comprised of local coalition leaders. They operationalized coalition as “organization of 
autonomous organizations with an agreed upon purpose, engaged in influencing an 
external change target”. Sampling was a purposive search of local leaders from coalitions 
which varied in size, longevity, issue, membership and domain. Sampling was non-
random, based on availability and reputation. Sampling resulted in a participant group of 
60 social change coalition leaders from the greater New York City and New Jersey area.  
They convened three focus group seminars where they asked coalition leaders to 
reflect on their practice in coalition-building. In doing so, researchers utilized a 600-item 
questionnaire which was intended to be a comprehensive overview of the multiple 
dimensions of coalitions and coalition-building. Through the survey responses and 
subsequent interviewing during the focus groups, researchers used a grounded theory 
methodology to generate research themes that should be further explored. The most 
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prominent themes that emerged were: developmental stages of coalitions, coalition 
goals, coalition targets, coalition strategies and tactics, coalition membership and 
constituency, commitment to and within the coalition, coalition resources, coalition 
leadership, decision-making within the coalition, coalition structure and operations, 
dilemmas in coalition functioning, and coalition success and failure. 
Researchers then developed an interview questionnaire to further explore the 
aforementioned themes in greater depth. The questionnaire included a combination of 
both open and closed questions. Some questions asked participants to rate according to a 
Likert scale (1-5) (i.e. How important is longevity in terms of defining coalition success?) 
while other questions captured nominal responses (i.e. how many years the coalition had 
been intact). The questionnaire also allowed participants to elaborate on their quantitative 
responses. Quantitative responses were analyzed for respective means and frequencies 
and qualitative responses were analyzed using grounded theory methodology. Of the 60 
focus group participants, 40 agreed to be interviewed in greater depth utilizing the new 
questionnaire. In this second stage of research, Mizrahi and Rosenthal were interested in 
exploring the following thematic questions: 
1. How do real coalition leaders define and measure success and failure? 
 
2. Do perceptions of actual experiences of coalition leaders influence ideas 
about coalition success and elements associated with success? 
 
3. Do coalitions which are reported to be totally successful differ 
significantly from coalitions which are only partially successful in terms of 
beliefs and experiences?  
 
These research themes guided researchers into developing the following research  
questions that would be addressed in the second stage of their research: 
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1. What factors reliably contribute to coalition effectiveness? 
 
2. Are there universal and/or intrinsic factors that contribute to coalition 
success? Or do different factors for success emerge in different definitions 
of success or actual experiences? 
 
3. Are factors which increase or decrease participation in coalitions related 
in any way to definitions of overall coalition success? 
 
4. Do definitions of success and definitions of failure reflect the same values 
and concerns? 
 
Findings. Mizrahi and Rosenthal (1993) highlighted the most significant findings along 
the following themes: coalition mission, reasons for coalition formation, coalition 
goals, definition of coalition success, coalition characterization of success, and internal 
elements that impact success.  
Coalition mission. All 40 participants stated that their coalition had more than 
one mission. Empowerment of a constituent group was most often identified (60%), 
followed by social and economic justice (57.5%). Health, education and social services 
was identified by 42.5% of the participants, followed by women’s issues (35%) and 
environmental preservation/protection (22.5%). Electoral work was identified least often 
(22.5%). Thirty percent of participants also identified other missions (not necessarily 
specified).  
Reasons for coalition formation. Similar to the question on coalition mission, 
most participants identified multiple reasons for coalition formation. By far the most 
indicated response was that members shared a common interest and hoped to affect a 
larger agenda (80%), followed by reaction to a crisis (57.5%), and reaction to a threat 
(35%). Past history of a successful coalition work was identified by 20% of participants 
and response to mandate from funders/regulators was identified least often (12%).  
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Coalition goals. As with past questions, all participants identified that their 
coalition had multiple goals that it was addressing. Passing legislation was identified 
most often (95%), followed by creating new policies (82.5%), influencing public opinion 
(72.5%), gaining funding (65%), defeating legislation (60%) and opposing policy 
decisions (52%). Opposing funding cuts was identified least often (30%). 
Definition of coalition success. Interestingly, all participants defined coalition 
success a number of ways. The exact frequencies for these responses was unavailable, but 
they are listed in order of importance: achieving goal(s), gaining recognition from target, 
gaining community support, members gaining new consciousness of issues, creating 
lasting networks, attaining longevity and lastly, members acquiring new skills.  
Coalition characterization of success. One of the most interesting findings that 
researchers found was that despite the ability to achieve primary goals or “last” as a 
coalition, not a single participant characterized their coalition as a total failure. At the 
time of these interviews, 10% of the coalitions had already terminated. The vast majority 
of participants (80%) characterized their coalition as a total success and 20% of 
participants characterized their coalition as somewhat successful.  
Internal elements that impact success. Participants identified a number of 
internal factors that impacted success in their coalition. As with previous responses, 
participants all identified multiple factors influencing success. Commitment to goal/cause 
was identified most often (95%), followed by competent leadership (92.5%), commitment 
to coalition (87.5%), equitable decision-making structure/process (80%), mutual respect 
(77.5%), broad-based constituency (75%), achieving interim victories (72.5%), members 
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continued contribution of resources (67.5%), and shared responsibility (65%). Adequate 
funding was identified less often (40%), as was good operating structure (40%), 
appropriate division of labor (35%), and past history of working relationship (27.5%). 
Right connections and contacts was identified least often (frequency unavailable).  
A refined framework for coalition success: The Four Cs. From these findings, 
Mizrahi and Rosenthal developed a refined framework for understanding coalition 
success. This framework is intended to be an applied model to guide coalition 
stakeholders in practice. The Four Cs are conditions, commitment, contributions, and 
competence.  
Conditions relate to the optimal political, economic and community climate for 
coalition success. Mizrahi and Rosenthal suggest that in order to successfully form a 
coalition, leaders and members consider the following conditions: ability to muster broad 
support, the level of receptivity in the community, the feasibility of “winning”, political 
and economic realities, past experiences with interorganizational relationships, past 
relationships with targets, the timing of coalescence and activities, the urgency of the 
goal, the relevance of the issue and the resources available to the coalition.  
Once the coalition has formed, Mizrahi and Rosenthal suggest that leaders 
consider the type of relationship between the coalition and its target(s) – is the 
relationship adversarial, neutral or cooperative? Leaders should also consider if the 
coalition’s goal(s) will generate support and sustained participation and should also 
consider the internal and external factors that will hinder or enhance participation.  
Commitment refers to the need for a core group of coalition members who must 
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stay involved until goals are achieved. Because there are varied levels of commitment 
from different members, it’s important to consider the type of commitment each member 
is making – is it pragmatic and self-interested or ideological and altruistic? Leaders must 
also consider the source of commitment – is the commitment to the goal itself and/or to 
the process of collaboration? In addition to type and source, leaders should consider the 
level of commitment – short or long term – in addition to the intensity of commitment – 
do participants view collaboration as a top priority? Useful for one issue but not meant to 
be sustained? Necessary but undesirable?  
Mizrahi and Rosenthal suggest that in order to maximize commitment to the 
coalition, leaders should allow for multiple levels of commitment and provide incentives 
for sustained participation. Leaders should also uncover motives by encouraging 
participants to articulate the extent of their commitment.  
Contributions refers to the resources, ideology and power necessary to achieve a 
goal. Resources includes access to key individuals, targets, media and a greater 
constituency; expertise and legitimacy on the issue and in coalition work; managerial 
skills; and resources like the ability to fundraise, secure space and equipment and secure 
competent staff and volunteers. Ideology refers to a broad vision for collaboration, a 
“tone” for the process of interacting and making decisions, strong values and beliefs that 
engender a lasting commitment. Power refers to the control of money, along with the 
control of punishment, rewards and information. It also refers to the ability to enact 
authority and to influence targets and the constituency. 
Because contributions are varied and fluctuate over time, Mizrahi and Rosenthal 
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suggest that coalition leaders assess contributions at each stage of development and 
clarify expectations around contributions. Leaders are encouraged to also find creative 
ways to balance contributions from members and to provide rewards for contributions 
that members make. 
Competence refers specifically to leadership style, ability and roles. In particular, 
Mizrahi and Rosenthal suggest that leaders approach collaboration in a non-hierarchical 
manner and consider the following leadership roles: facilitator of meetings and of work 
between meetings; communicator who creates and maintains channels of communication 
and serves as the source from which coalition information emanates; process (feelings) 
watcher who pays attention to the emotional climate and suggests changes to maintain 
changes to maintain equal participation; note takers who record processes; representative 
who gives voice to all coalition participants; spokesperson who acts as the coalition’s 
public image to targets, media and the public; visionary who inspires diverse groups to 
work together; strategist who helps establish goals and tactics and possesses good 
political skills.  
Ultimately, Mizrahi and Rosenthal believe that effective coalition leaders know 
how to cultivate harmony within the group while guiding diverse participants to achieve 
consensus in regards to goals, strategies and actions. They maintain a larger vision while 
attending to the practical operations of the coalition. Effective leaders also find ways to 
sustain interest and participation from diverse members and foster a sense of ownership 
amongst all members. Effective leaders also possess good negotiating and conflict 
mediation skills.  
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Mizrahi and Rosenthal identified the following “task” skills as important for 
coalition leaders to possess: media savvy, legislative advocacy, communication, 
delegation, fundraising, meeting facilitation, management, negotiation, planning, public 
speaking, assessing needs, strategizing and writing. They also identify the following 
“process” skills as important for coalition leaders to possess: balancing priorities, 
managing conflict, eliciting input, patience, perseverance, sensitivity to cultural and 
identity differences, interpersonal skills, and an ability to articulate how each participant 
can contribute toward the greater vision.  
This framework is the basis for the work of my dissertation, including the 
development of research themes and questions. The findings from the original study will 
be revisited in the results and discussion sections.  
Personal and Professional Interests in Coalitions  
My own interest in coalitions and collaborations grew from a collaborative 
experience I had prior to “knowing” about coalitions in the academic sense. In 2006, in 
my first year of my program as a Master of Social Work at California State University, 
East Bay, I was elected by my peers to serve as the Student Director North to the Board 
of Directors of the National Association of Social Workers, California Chapter. Early in 
first day of the first board meeting I attended, the Student Director South – a student from 
the University of Southern California – and I began to talk. It had become apparent to 
both of us in the initial hours of the meeting that our California Chapter Board of 
Directors was lacking significantly in social workers who considered themselves 
organizers and/or activists. Moreover, it seemed that the content of the board meetings 
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lacked attention to greater social justice issues; instead, the meeting agenda was solely 
focused on mental health and clinical concerns from a micro perspective. The other 
student and I agreed this was a problem and committed ourselves to creating an 
opportunity for the board to re-dedicate themselves to what we believed to be the mission 
of our profession – to act as agents of change in achieving social justice. 
That afternoon we began to brainstorm. Because we were separated by the 
geographical constraints of the state of California, we first identified a region where we 
could realistically participate in some work together and settled on the Central Valley of 
California. It became obvious to us that we could join in the justice work that has been 
done there for decades – specifically the work around the sub-human treatment of 
farmworkers, many of whom are undocumented immigrants. We reached out to the 
Dolores Huerta Foundation (DHF) and connected with one of their lead organizers who 
was eager to have us collaborate with them. The DHF is a non-profit organization that 
engages and develops local leaders to address issues of social, economic, environmental 
and educational injustice. Much of their work is a continuation of the work of Dolores 
Huerta (who still continues in her pursuit of justice), Cesar Chavez, Fred Ross and the 
United Farm Workers (Dolores Huerta Foundation, 2016). We agreed to collaborate and 
worked up a loose plan and budget that the other Student Director and I would propose to 
our board.  
The lead organizer told us that many of their members had been voicing concerns 
about their living and working conditions but had yet to quantify these issues. He also 
told us that the organization had a pre-existing relationship with a local university – 
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California State University, Bakersfield. He asked if we would be willing to engage 
social work students across the state to come to the Central Valley, visit with families, 
learn about their experiences and in the process, conduct a needs assessment. We 
subsequently recruited two social work students from each of the 23 social work 
programs in the state. We convened in the Central Valley and were re-distributed to 
community members’ homes, where we stayed for a week. In the process of developing 
relationships with the families, we also collaborated to conduct a formal needs 
assessment. Out of families’ living rooms, community members came into be 
interviewed. DHF members conducted most of the interviews and the social work 
students ensured that IRB and ethical research protocol was followed. At the end of the 
week we came together to celebrate the relationships we had built and to discuss our 
initial findings. 
Once our “service learning project” officially ended, the interviews were collected 
and analyzed by students at CSU Bakersfield and the results were returned to the DHF 
community members, who utilized the findings to continue their work and to guide their 
legislative advocacy. We joined together again months later at NASW’s Annual 
Legislative Lobby Days, where DHF members were invited to join NASW members in 
their lobby visits. The DHF members effectively co-opted our agenda to discuss a mental 
health bill and instead discussed the sub-human treatment of the farmworkers who grow 
and pick most of our country’s produce. It was a beautiful and humbling moment for me 
as social worker and organizer.  
I reflected on this experience as I began my master’s degree thesis capstone and 
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decided to use this experience as a case study for my project. Everyone that had been 
involved agreed it was a monumental success – but why? And how? As I embarked my 
literature search I began to realize that we had formed what could be considered a 
coalition, and what was certainly considered a collaboration. I also began to realize that 
Terry Mizrahi and Beth Rosenthal had concretized much of the available knowledge on 
this topic and their work provided an initial framework for understanding our success. It 
was particularly useful because Mizrahi and Rosenthal’s work focused on perceptions of 
success in addition to objective measures of success. This resonated with me because it 
validated the knowledge that we and our collaborators had – we knew that our 
collaboration was successful without knowing if we had achieved anything “objectively”. 
This epistemological standpoint is important for a researcher like myself who highly 
values participatory processes in research.  
Current Study. The purpose of my dissertation is to contribute to the greater 
theoretical knowledge on collaboration and coalitions. In this pursuit, I will adapt the 
instrument used in the original Mizrahi and Rosenthal study, and, returning to both the 
original sample and new coalition participants, examine how coalition leaders perceive 
coalition success, along with the internal and environmental predictors of coalition 
success. I will employ basic descriptive analysis to analyze the structured interview items 
as well as grounded theory methodology to analyze qualitative responses. Findings will 
be presented in aggregate and by comparison of leaders from intact coalitions versus 
leaders from dormant coalitions. Findings will culminate in a refined list of predictors for 
coalition success.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Understanding and subsequently studying coalitions requires those interested to 
first operationalize the object under study. Coalitions take various forms and structures 
and their seemingly amorphous nature can make it difficult to frame the conversation 
under an appropriate conceptual framework. In this chapter, I will review the relevant 
literature on organizations and networks and the impact of social capital, along with the 
literature on coalitions and other forms of collaboration, and will synthesize this 
information to develop a refined list of variables from which to better understand 
coalition success. 
Operationalizing Terms 
In Mizrahi and Rosenthal’s original study (1993), researchers utilized the 
following definition for coalition: an “organization of autonomous organizations with an 
agreed upon purpose, engaged in influencing an external change target.” Operationalizing 
the term coalition in this way allowed the researchers to employ organizational theory to 
understand coalition structure and processes and provided a solid starting point for 
coalition analysis. This definition is problematic in some aspects, however, as it does not 
necessarily capture all components of coalitions as they operate in practice. Firstly, not 
all coalitions are comprised of autonomous organizations. Coalition members may be 
individuals acting on their own agency and do not necessarily represent a larger entity 
(Staggenborg, 2015). Secondly, as will be addressed in this study, all coalitions are not 
necessarily attempting to influence an external change target.  Some coalitions’ mission 
and goals are to affect themselves, and more particularly, their members, without 
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interacting or influencing an external target. Not quite an organization of organizations, 
coalitions seem to act as an intermediary on the continuum of collective movement. 
Coalitions are more consistent than discrete collective actions but not as encompassing as 
a social movement. In other words, coalitions may act as a vehicle for collective action 
toward a larger social movement. 
Coalitions appear to have a unique form and function, distinct from organizations 
as well as other forms of collective action. There are, however, many aspects of related 
theories that inform our understanding of coalitions themselves. The literature review that 
follows will culminate in a more refined framework for which to understand coalitions. 
Toward a Theoretical Framework: Social Capital in Networks 
Understanding how social capital operates in networks provides a powerful lens 
through which to view coalition success. Macke and Dilly (2010) describe how 
relationships, and thus social capital, operate as a resource for social action. They 
paraphrase Skidmore (2001) in delineating the economic benefits of operating in 
network, all of which are pertinent to social change coalitions:   
(i) high levels of social trust and strong reciprocity rules reduce 
transaction’s costs; (ii) social networks minimize risks, once they allow 
members to engage innovations and higher risk’s levels; (iii) social 
networks ease the quick dissemination of information and this fact reduces 
asymmetries; (iv) social networks allow their members to easily solve 
collective action problems (p.125). 
 
This summary describes how when working in collaboration, social norms around 
reciprocity become the vehicle through which social capital is transacted. In other words, 
the benefits of working in network cannot be articulated without an understanding of how 
social capital is developed and exchanged within that network.  
 17 
The concept and application of social capital has been fluid and amorphous, with 
different theorists posing different operations of the term. This study is informed by 
Bourdieu’s definition of social capital as, “the aggregate of the actual or potential 
resources which are linked to the possession of a durable network of more or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition (1985, p.248).” 
Bourdieu, however, was concerned with the benefits of social capital for the individual. 
Loury (1981) challenged this notion, suggesting that the benefits of social capital are 
inherently social. Putnam (2000) offered a compromise, suggesting that the unit of 
analysis debate be determined empirically, as will be done here.  
For the purpose of understanding the path toward coalition success, this study will 
employ a definition of social capital which specifically captures how social capital 
operates in collaborative relationships and networks. Macke and Dilly describe social 
capital as “a set of characteristics of a human organization that encompasses the relations 
between individuals or groups, the standards of social behavior, the mutual reciprocity 
and make actions possible because they are based on a collaborative process (p.123).”  
Social capital encompasses both bonding, or the strength of relationships where 
people demonstrate concern and support (Lockhart, 2005), and bridging, where members 
(or organizations) transverse material barriers of race, gender, class, and other 
characteristics (Putnam, 2000). Bonding is indicated by high levels of participation in 
mutual aid and results in the development of strong, dense ties and localized trust. 
Bridging, on the other hand, occurs across groups or networks through weak ties, 
providing access to previously untapped gatekeepers and resources. 
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This study adopts the social capital framework developed by Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal (1998) and will include variables that capture the structural dimensions, or the 
structure of the coalition itself and the networks within which it is embedded; and the 
presence of relationships within the coalition, including the strength and stability of those 
ties (Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1988, Granovetter, 1973). It will also include variables 
associated with the relational dimensions of social capital, or how relationships within 
the coalition or network and the endurance of the coalition and network are influenced by 
respect, trust (or lack thereof), acceptance, shared norms, obligations, commitment, 
participation, and diversity (Granovetter, 1973; Maak, 2007); as well as the cognitive 
dimensions of social capital, which include shared values and visions, collective self-
interest and the expectation of mutual reciprocity (Macke & Dilly, 2010). 
 The Effects of Race and Power. Social capital is often associated with 
seemingly positive general outcomes; however, it is important to note that the concept of 
social capital cannot be applied equally to all individuals or groups. For all its purported 
advantages, amassing social capital and reaping its benefits is not the same experience for 
all members of our society. First, individual identity (or salient identifying features) 
affects who we choose to associate with and who chooses to associate with us (Ibarra, 
Kilduff & Tsai, 2005). In other words, bonding, almost always follows lines of racial 
homogeneity (Bodella, 2007). This is especially important for coalitions that not only 
serve marginalized populations, but whose goal is often to have full inclusivity and 
community participation. As Staggenborg and others note, challenges manifest in 
collaboration amongst diverse actors. Often, comfort and efficiency is valued at a higher 
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rate than inclusivity and so racial (and other forms) of diversity is spared (Raynor, 2011; 
Rosenthal, Greenawalt, Ivery, Mizrahi, 2016).  
Racial disparities have been left out of many studies that have considered social 
capital, where measures have been displayed on an aggregate level, and in doing so, have 
failed to capture the experience of people of color in America (Jennings, 2007; Orr, 
1999). As Hero points out, there appears to be a strong negative relationship between race 
and social capital. When diversity increases, social capital decreases; thus, one can expect 
to see racially homogenous groups in areas with high social capital. Furthermore, racially 
homogenous white groups are privileged to enjoy the benefits of a powerful, tightly-
closed network. White groups are able to actively “bond”, tapping into their social capital 
to perpetuate existing dominant ideologies and norms, which creates the greatest 
opportunity to convert social capital into a more significant form of capital. Historically, 
coalitions represented by people of color are forced to “bridge” with predominately white 
groups and institutions in order to amass social capital and have the opportunity to 
accumulate more tangible benefits (Brown & Brown, 2003).  Moreover, in instances 
where communities of color refuse to assimilate, their efforts at “bonding” are viewed as 
threats to the dominant power structure, and as a result, are thwarted (Jennings, 2007).  
These findings suggest that coalitions which are dominated by white, middle-class 
ideology and norms may achieve success with weaker community ties, as compared to 
diverse coalitions or those represented primarily by people of color. More specifically, 
predominately white coalitions may find they can achieve their coalition goals without 
being tightly coupled or having strong ties with the community and its institutions. This 
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discussion lends itself to the idea that the larger variable of power be considered. This 
study will examine how the demographic variables of the members within a coalition — 
race, class, gender, orientation, ability, etc. — influence affiliation with dominant culture, 
the ability to develop social capital, and ultimately the power to enact change. 
The value of social capital becomes difficult to measure when one considers the 
effects of race and power on a coalition’s ability to achieve its goals. The development 
and value of social capital in coalitions will be examined in this study and determined 
empirically. Data around racial and ethnic demographics will be included to allow for a 
more nuanced analysis of social capital and race.   
Defining Coalition Success  
Researchers have suggested that coalition success is defined on a number of 
dimensions (Kreutzer, Lezin & Young, 2000) and should include both quantitative and 
qualitative definitions (El Ansari & Weiss, 2006). In their original study, Mizrahi and 
Rosenthal asked participants to describe if and how their coalition had been successful. 
Researchers found that all participants identified their respective coalition as being at 
least partially successful, even if the coalition did not achieve its goals. Goal achievement 
was, however, considered to be the strongest predictor of success, according to 
participants. In addition to goal achievement, success was also predicted by gaining 
recognition from social change targets, consciousness-raising, creating lasting networks, 
attaining longevity and acquiring new skills.  
The identification of targets, definition of goals, and evaluation of successes 
within the coalition constitute both internal variables of the coalition and external 
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variables that pertain to the coalition’s relationship with its environment. The variables 
which allow the coalition to come together around shared goals and function as an entity 
will be described at internal predictors. The influence of the coalition on its environment 
and the influence of the environment on a coalition will be described as environmental 
predictors, and will include social, political and economic conditions.  These questions 
will be informed, in part, by social capital and network theory. 
Internal Predictors of Coalition Success 
A coalition can be analyzed by examining a number of characteristics that 
influence its ability to succeed in its environment or conversely, its chances of 
dissolution. As the section on defining success indicates, goal-setting appears to be an 
important predictor of coalition success, and will be examined in this study. In 
relationship to goals, identification of target and strategy must also be considered. For 
example, if the goal of a coalition is community development, strategies are more likely 
to be cooperative (Staples, 2004; 2016). For coalitions with inward-facing goals, one can 
assume that the group must be able to bond over shared values and goals and develop an 
infrastructure which facilitates trust and mutual cooperation. If, on the other hand, a 
community has outward facing goals, a number of external conditions will facilitate the 
chances of successfully achieving those goals (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004; Brettell, 
2005). A coalition with outward facing goals may also be working toward community 
development, partnering with external stakeholders to persuade or influence a target.  
Conversely, a coalition may have identified external stakeholders as the target and may 
employ adversarial or oppositional strategies to influence such target. Social action 
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strategies are utilized when partnering is undesirable and the coalition perceives the need 
to oppose and transform the existing power structure. These actions are considered 
“adversarial because they are employed to make external decision-makers do what they 
would not otherwise do (Staples, 2004, p.9).” 
In addition to goal-setting, strategy and identification of target, the following 
internal factors may also be significant predictors of coalition success: impetus to form; 
internal resources; power and decision-making; member contributions; diversity; and 
relationships, including aspects of respect, trust, commitment and communication. 
The motivation for coalition formation, or impetus to form, is also an important 
factor to consider. As Sowa (2009) notes, entities decide to collaborate for a number of 
reasons, including acquiring new resources, leveraging new ideas, or to satisfy pressures 
of the environment. By understanding “what organizations believe to be the benefits of 
entering into an interagency collaboration (i.e. why they collaborate), the more it will be 
possible to ascertain whether those benefits were actually achieved. Guo and Acar (2005) 
utilized resource dependency, institutional and network theories to understand why 
organizations choose to collaborate. They found that organizations which receive 
government funding but rely on fewer funding streams, have a larger budget and pre-
existing linkages in the community are more likely to join together in formal 
collaboration, such as in a coalition. Resource dependence and perception of transaction 
costs are important factors in deciding to collaborate (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; 
Williamson, 1985), but how do resources influence the coalition’s ability to succeed? 
While the leaders in Mizrahi and Rosenthal’s original study stated that tangible resources 
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(i.e. funding) were of the least important factors, these factors intuitively must be 
considered. As Pfeffer and Salancik note, “the key to organizational survival is the ability 
to acquire and maintain resources (2003, p.2). In addition to external funding sources, 
internal financial contributions will be considered. Member dues may be an important 
internal resource, especially in large and long-standing coalitions.  
Leadership is another significant factor and one which describes the ability to 
successfully exercise relationship, political and technical skills (Bayne-Smith, Mizrahi & 
Garcia, 2008; Mizrahi & Rosenthal, 2001), and maintain focus on the “big picture” 
(Alexander, Comfort, Weiner & Bogue, 2001). This definition encompasses both 
leadership style and approach. A number of studies have demonstrated that organization 
members’ attitudes and performance are directly related to whether they perceive their 
leader as considerate, supportive and inclusive (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Kaiser, Hogan & 
Craig, 2000). Conversely, members who perceive their leader to be unjust, unfair or 
exclusive will feel alienated and less committed to the organization or coalition (Kaiser, 
Hogan & Craig). Leaders facilitate the bonding process by creating the context in which 
to achieve goals. In other words, leaders specify roles and expectations and coordinate 
collective action (Burke, Stagl, Klein, Goodwin, Salas & Halpin 2006; Kozlowski, Gully, 
Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 1996). Leaders ultimately choose where and how the coalition 
should direct its energy. Leaders are responsible for facilitating group interaction and 
ensuring clear channels of communication (Hackman, 2002). In this sense, leadership 
appears to directly influence a coalition’s social capital. 
Burns (1978) provides two models of democratic leadership applicable to 
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leadership in social change coalitions. When coalition goals are shared and explicit, 
leaders should serve as transactional figures, balancing competing interest and needs, 
and creating clear lines of communication to transmit information. In other words, a 
transactional leader facilitates the already functional apparatus that is the coalition, in this 
case. By contrast, a transformational leader may divert, change, influence or create the 
goals of a coalition. Transformational leadership is associated with the development of 
social capital within a network (Balkundi & Kilduff, 2005) in that “leaders create stable 
relationships with trusted partners, [and] over time, these ties accumulate into a mutually 
beneficial network and ultimately generate stakeholder social capital (p.340).”  
The variable of power is related to leadership. In a coalition, leadership and power 
take a much different form when compared to its traditional hierarchical counterparts. 
Traditional organizations call for an authoritative type of leadership, where the position 
of leader is set within a hierarchy and where the leader is granted both legitimate 
authority and the means to enact change within the organization (Alexander, Comfort, 
Weiner & Bogue).  In collaborative partnerships, however, leaders are granted limited 
formal authority and limited means to enact change (Joyner, 2000; Avery, 1999). 
Leadership is more diffuse and carries with it less power than in a traditional hierarchical 
structure.  
Also related to leadership and power is decision-making structure, which has also 
shown to be an influential variable (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972; Foster-Fishman, 
Berkowitz, Lounsbury, Jacobson & Allen, 2001; Speer & Zippay, 2005; Wells, Ford, 
McClure, Holt & Ward, 2007). One might expect that coalitions with a history of 
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successful democratic decision-making would display higher levels of social capital. In a 
shared decision-making structure, it is assumed that compromises and trade-offs must be 
made. The willingness of group members to compromise is entirely dependent on the 
belief that such “favors” will be returned at another point in time. Again, the mechanisms 
of social capital are evident. Various aspects of leadership style and approach will be 
examined in this study, along with an analysis of decision-making processes.  
 In addition to tangible financial contributions in the form of member dues, 
members’ knowledge, skills and abilities – constitute many of the resources that the 
coalition holds itself. Capitalizing on members’ diverse skill sets seems to be indicative 
of coalition success and the ability to do so is contingent on effective leadership (Bayne-
Smith, Mizrahi & Garcia, 2008). Trust, commitment and communication are consistently 
cited as important components to the successful creation and maintenance of a 
collaborative network (Putnam, 2000). Individuals join organizations and organizations 
join coalitions for the same reason: because they perceive – or trust - that they will be 
able to exchange their contributions to the coalition for resources not otherwise available 
(Leanna & Van Buren, 1999; Watson & Papamarcos, 2002). The level of trust and 
respect is an integral component of coalition success (Bayne-Smith, Mizrahi & Garcia, 
2008; Burt, 2004; Butterfoss, 2007; Easterling, 2003; Ibarra, Kilduff & Tsai, 2005) as is 
communication (Easterling, 2003; Mattessich, Murray-Close & Monsey, 2001). 
These internal factors highlight the significance of social capital in the trajectory 
of social change coalitions, as the mutual contingency of trust and commitment within the 
context of social capital becomes evident. Alexander and colleagues suggested that the 
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key to sustained commitment is the degree to which member organizations are able to 
achieve their own organizational mission and goals through coalition involvement. As 
Mizrahi and Rosenthal (2001) suggest, “commitment is usually conceptualized as part of 
the dichotomy between self-interest and altruism, or between pragmatism and ideology 
(p.65).” As one respondent noted, “organizations participated in our coalition because 
they received a great deal of information, expertise and contacts (p.70).” In other words, 
commitment fosters trust and trust fosters commitment. Further, in terms of a coalition, 
trust is developed when member organizations choose to participate under the implicit 
agreement that they will somehow benefit. Trust is strengthened when member 
organizations perceive that they have benefited from participation. Conversely, when 
participants feel as if they have not benefitted due to a perception of others’ lack of 
commitment, trust will erode. The decision to participate in a coalition and sustain 
investment ultimately becomes a calculated analysis of the costs and benefits of 
exchange. This study will consider the benefits of social capital from a coalition 
standpoint. Individual commitment, however, is linked to positive individual benefits. In 
asking participants about their commitment, I will also be including their experiences of 
individual benefits.     
 Coalition success is dependent on member commitment and participants feeling 
positive about their role in the coalition (Foster-Fishman, Berkowitz, Lounsbury, 
Jacobson & Allen, 2001). A well-developed internal communication system also appears 
to be a solid predictor of coalition success (Foster-Fishman, et al., 2001). In addition to 
the exchange of information, the style and quality of communication within an 
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organization affects the members’ level of commitment to that organization. 
Communication allows for a common understanding of both the task ahead and the 
reasons behind the decisions that have been made. Communication channels serve as 
vehicles for organizational norms and expectations (Berger & Luckman, 1966; Weick, 
1995). Clear and reliable communication is indicative of member commitment, as was 
trust in management and colleagues (Watson & Papamarcos, 2002). Again, the 
interdependence of the variables is revealed: trust and commitment strengthen each other 
and are strengthened by each other through effective communication.    
Although organizational literature informs our understanding of coalition 
behavior, it does not comprehensively describe the particular structure of coalitions. 
Organizations are perceived as structurally solid, whereas coalitions may be more 
amorphous. Positions are institutionalized within organizations whereas in coalitions, 
positions are more tenuous. Organizations themselves may institutionalize a role in a 
coalition, or the role may not necessarily be built into the position itself. An organization 
may support a staff members’ participation in a coalition without formally endorsing it by 
codifying it into a job description. The result is that an organizations involvement in a 
coalition is driven by a particular persons’ interest and if that person should depart the 
organization, so does the organization’s representation in the coalition.  Coalition 
membership also diverges from organizational involvement when we consider the 
involvement of single actors not representing member organizations. As Staggenborg 
notes, more attention needs to be paid to looser, informal alliances and whether the term 
coalition accurately describes these networks of collaboration.  
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Environmental Predictors of Coalition Success 
A coalition is subject to the many pressures of its environment. Theorists of 
organizational ecology suggest that organizational functioning is influenced by internal 
factors and environmental factors. As such, this study will analyze environmental factors 
that affect coalitions. Organizations or coalitions must become part of an 
interorganizational network. Participation in this network alters the balance of resources 
and power – by embedding themselves in the environment, organizations affect and are 
affected by the environment (Baum, 1996; Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Thompson, 1967). 
Resource dependence describes the coalition’s relationship with its environment. 
According to Pfeffer and Salancik, the ability to meet the demands of interest groups 
influences the ability to gain resources from those groups and ultimately survive.  In fact, 
coalitions often form because of external pressures such as reduced funding or policy 
mandates (Aldrich, 2006; Ivery, 2007).  The ability of a coalition to manage the 
information from its environment and to adapt to environmental demands while still 
meeting the demands of its own organization is a key component to the coalition’s 
maintenance.  
A successful coalition allows for feedback in order to better its changing 
relationship to the environment (Foster-Fishman et al., 2001). Mizrahi and Rosenthal use 
the term “competency” to refer to the ability of a coalition to learn from and adapt to its 
environment. Consistent with research by Mizrahi and Rosenthal, Foster-Fishman and 
colleagues describe both the interactions among members and the ability of the coalition 
to work with those outside the coalition as “relationship capacity”. The ability to optimize 
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networks and work with community members, policy makers, community leaders and 
other coalitions is an integral predictor of coalition success (Bayne-Smith, Mizrahi & 
Garcia, 2008). Degree of coupling; relationship with community and other organizations; 
and organizational longevity appear to be environmental predictors of coalition success 
and dissolution. Additionally, goal-setting, strategy and identification of target re-emerge 
as environmental predictors linked to coalition strategy. As aforementioned, if the 
coalition has an external target or goal (i.e. policy change), the degree to which the 
coalition desires to and is able to bridge with community agents and/or affect community 
targets will affect its chances of success (Brettell, 2005; Edwards & McCarthy, 2004). 
Degree of coupling refers to the strength of the coalition’s community 
relationship and its influences on other organizations in the field. A loosely coupled 
coalition will have a lower level of collaboration and integration as compared to a tightly 
coupled coalition, which tends to have a stronger influence on other institutions in the 
environment (Aldrich, 1979). As Ivery (2007) noted, organizations and coalitions may 
serve a variety of functions by being loosely or tightly coupled. In her study, Ivery found 
that organizations which allowed for fluid relationships benefit the most, allowing for 
highly committed partnerships with some entities, and loose, sporadic partnerships with 
others, depending on the environmental needs and the needs of each organization or 
coalition. This was consistent with Thompson’s (1967) findings which suggested that 
organizations which allowed for such flexibility found positive outcomes in their 
organizational functioning.    
A coalition’s relationship with the community mirrors its own internal 
 30 
relationships, in that power and responsibility are shared. A study by Alexander (2001) 
and colleagues generated these results, showing that coalitions firmly linked to the 
community and coalitions that had channels open for input from the community were 
more likely to have sustained collaborative relationships. A network of trusting 
relationships between coalitions and other organizations facilitates collaboration, building 
social capital and ultimately expanding the benefits for all involved (Ibarra, Kilduff & 
Tsai, 2005). This study will examine each coalition’s relationships with other coalitions, 
other organizations and other non-member individuals, including elected officials. Rog 
and colleagues (2004) note that the specific political and fiscal climate within which a 
coalition is embedded affects the coalition itself, and these dimensions will be analyzed 
as well.  
Positive past relationships may result in organizational longevity. Longevity is an 
often-cited variable indicating coalition success. Bronstein’s 2002 review of successful 
coalition relationships confirmed what many had suggested before; namely, that a history 
of successful collaboration is associated with potential for success in current 
collaboration (Mattessich Murray- Close & Monsey, 2001; Mizrahi & Rosenthal, 2001). 
Mattesich and Monsey’s (1993) research revealed that past experiences of successful 
collaboration lead individuals to think favorably about collaboration and consequently 
these participants were more likely to engage in it again. Past success does not 
necessarily dictate current success, however. Mizrahi and Rosenthal found previous 
history of working relationship to be the least important predictor of success, as 
compared to other variables presented. From a social capital standpoint, organizational 
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longevity may represent successes at both bridging and bonding or that the coalition has 
successfully exchanged social capital for other forms of capital which sustain the 
organization.  
Coalitions: A Growing Body of Knowledge 
Practitioners, activists and theorists are converging around the idea that coalitions 
are unique entities that differ, to some degree, from organizations, social movements and 
other forms of collective action. Mattesich and Monsey (2001) posited 19 factors that 
influence coalitions and their success. These factors have persisted as significant in 
predicting success for collaborations. This comprehensive framework is informed by 
organizational, network and social capital theory. As summarized by Winer (1994, p. 
138) in the Collaboration Handbook, those factors are:  
Factors Related to the Environment: 
1. History of collaboration or cooperation in the community  
2. Collaborative group seen as a leader in the community  
3. Political/social climate favorable 
Factors Related to Membership Characteristics 
4. Mutual respect, understanding and trust 
5. Appropriate cross-section of members 
6. Members see collaboration as in their self-interest 
7. Ability to compromise  
Factors Related to Process/Structure 
8. Members share a stake in both process and outcome 
9. Multiple layers of decision-making 
10. Flexibility  
11. Development of clear roles and policy guidelines 
12. Adaptability  
Factors Related to Communication 
13. Open and frequent communication 
14. Established informal and formal communication links 
Factors Related to Purpose 
15. Concrete, attainable goals and objectives 
16. Shared vision 
17. Unique purpose 
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Factors Related to Resources 
18. Sufficient funds 
19. Skilled convener  
 
Mizrahi and Rosenthal’s 4 Cs have since been revisited by Rosenthal, 
Greenawalt, Ivery and Mizrahi (2016) to incorporate many of the changes to coalition-
building that have developed over the decades. These authors suggest that coalitions are 
most likely to succeed when leaders and members can successfully manage the dynamic 
tensions between the coalition itself and the member organizations in terms of mixed 
loyalties, divergent goals, and autonomy and accountability. They also suggest that 
coalitions coordinate collaboration, potentially by identifying a lead organization to 
facilitate that process, while allowing for flexible participation by coalition members. 
Additionally, they suggest that coalitions are most likely to succeed when membership is 
constantly being replenished and simultaneously, that organizations deciding to join 
conduct a “readiness audit” in order to assess the capacity and desire for collaboration. 
As social media and other forms of virtual technology continue to proliferate, it’s 
important for coalitions to make strategic decisions on how to utilize this technology in 
recognition of the importance of communication outside of the coalition. They also 
suggest that coalitions take ongoing stock of resources and human capital, while allowing 
for varied investment of members’ resources into the coalition. 
 In terms of leadership, these authors suggest that a facilitative, collaborative type 
of leadership is ideal, where leaders are able to act as visionaries while also being task-
focused. They suggest that coalition leaders must have good group facilitation and 
mediation skills. Leaders should also be responsible for helping to develop groups norms 
 33 
and cohesion by cultivating trust, respect and open communication and act to delineate 
roles and responsibilities.    
Lastly, coalition members should make informed choices about coalition 
operation dependent on the phase of the coalitions’ “life”: pre-formation, formation, 
implementation, maintenance and termination and ultimately measure and define success 
along a multitude of dimensions. 
Rosenthal and colleagues confirmed many of the suggestions made by Wolff 
(2001), who suggested that in order for a coalition to succeed, partners must first assess 
their readiness to collaborate and solve community problems and in particular, identify 
where the desire to collaborate is stemming from and whether or not there is a history of 
successful collaboration in that community. Assessing for readiness also means 
examining the relational dynamics between partners and assessing for oversaturation of 
coalitions in the community of interest. Ultimately, communities must take stock of their 
assets, including the availability and capacity of grassroots leadership. 
Wolff also suggests that coalition members articulate a shared vision and mission, 
early on in the process, developing clear goals and plans for action. Moreover, this 
process should be “bottom-up”; in other words, the vision should be articulated by the 
community affected by the issue at hand. In terms of structure, Wolff suggests that 
coalition funding and staffing is important, but not necessary. He suggests that coalitions 
identify its role within the community and seek specific funding sources to support that 
role, while utilizing the in-kind contributions of member organizations.  
Wolff suggests that coalitions structure decision-making and communication 
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processes and also identify who will provide technical assistance. Wolff also suggests 
that coalitions stay focused on “action” and avoid getting bogged down in the planning 
phases and incorporate action that is both internal (within the community) and external 
(on the policy level).   
Of great importance is that coalitions intentionally develop broad, inclusive and 
diverse membership and state their commitment to doing so early on. He suggests 
utilizing the “inclusivity checklist” developed by Rosenthal (1997), which helps a 
coalition assess its degree of appreciation for a diverse membership. The checklist, found 
in the Community Tool Box, is as follows: 
1. The leadership of our coalition is multiracial and multicultural. 
2. We work hard to recruit members who represent the diversity of our  
community.  
3. We make special efforts to cultivate new leaders, particularly people of 
color.  
4. Our mission, operations and products reflect the contributions of diverse 
cultural and social groups.  
5. Members of diverse cultural and social groups are full participants in all 
aspects of our coalition’s work.  
6. Meetings are not dominated by speakers from any one group. 
7. All segments of our community are represented in decision-making.  
8. We are sensitive and aware of different religious and cultural holidays, 
customs, and food preferences.  
9. We communicate clearly and people of different cultures feel comfortable 
sharing their opinions and participating in meetings.  
10. We prohibit the use of ethnic, racial and sexual stereotypes and 
prejudicial comments, slurs or jokes. 
 
In terms of sustaining active participation, Wolff believes that coalitions need to 
understand why people participate and ensure that all members feel recognized, respected 
and rewarded. The most successful coalitions are comprised of members who ALL feel 
some degree of ownership over the coalition itself.  
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Successful coalition leaders, according to Wolff operate from a transformative, 
collaborative perspective. Chrislip and Larson (1994) identified four principles of 
collaborative leadership. According to these authors, collaborative leaders (1) inspire 
commitment and action; (2) problem-solve; (3); facilitate broad-based participation and 
(4) sustain hope and commitment. As Wolff notes, at the core of successful coalitions is 
strong relationships. Leaders must be able to facilitate relationship-building and manage 
conflict inherent in those relationships. Wolff suggests that power-based and relationship-
based change are not mutually exclusive, stating, 
Coalitions may falsely distinguish between the processes of power-based 
social change (or community organizing) and relationship-based social 
change (or community building). In the power-based approach, citizens 
form organizations that aim to transform and redistribute power. In the 
relationship-based approach, change occurs through building strong, caring, 
and respectful relationships among community members. Although they are 
different, these two approaches are not incompatible. Rather, coalition 
building requires both kinds of social change: a mix of advocacy and 
relationship building, each used where appropriate (p.180).  
  
Doll and colleagues (2012), utilized Mattesich and Monsey’s framework in 
review of successful community-researcher partnerships, suggest that factors contributing 
to the successful maintenance of a coalition include creating a diverse coalition 
membership, developing cohesion and trust within the coalition, developing a shared 
vision, and facilitating the development of clear goals and purpose.  Conversely, they 
suggest that barriers to functioning include a lack of clarity around roles and 
responsibilities and difficulties balancing resource and power dynamic of various 
coalition partners. Rog and colleagues (2004) identified similar components of coalitions 
as predicting success, including having a history of collaboration, a broad and diverse 
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membership, clearly articulated goals and guidelines, and sufficient funding.  
This study will apply this comprehensive and multi-dimensional lens to the 
coalitions under study and in doing so, will examine quantitative and qualitative 
participant responses to examine factors perceived to predict coalition success. This study 
will utilize literature from organizations, networks, social capital theory and 
collaborations to generate a more nuanced definition of coalitions and to develop a more 
refined list of variables for understanding coalition success.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODS 
This study utilized interview responses from original leader participants of 
Mizrahi and Rosenthal’s study as well as current leader participants. The intention of this 
study is to contribute to the greater theoretical knowledge on collaboration and coalitions. 
In order to do so, my specific research questions are:   
1. How do coalition leaders define coalition success? 
 
2. What internal and environmental factors predict failure/dissolution, 
as identified by leaders? 
 
3. What internal features predict coalition success, as identified by 
leaders? 
 
4. What environmental features predict coalition success, as identified 
by leaders? 
 
5. How does social capital theory explain coalition success? 
 
6. What are the specific political, fiscal and social conditions that 
influenced the development and lifespan of the coalitions under study?  
 
7. How can the practice knowledge of these seasoned leaders contribute 
to the body of knowledge on coalition-building? 
 
Sampling and Procedure 
My sample consisted of organizations that participated in the original Mizrahi and 
Rosenthal study. This study presents two separate sub-group comparisons. In Chapter 4, 
on the study sample, findings will be presented in total, and by responses from “original” 
participants (n=23) versus responses from “new” participants (n=7). Sampling for 
“original” participants was non-random and non-probability and sampling for “new” 
participants was also a non-random and non-probability sample, and in some cases, 
snowball sampling was used to identify sample participants. In an effort to inform the 
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discussion on reflexivity, positionality and diversity, these two groups provide an 
interesting comparison. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 will present finding in total, as well as by 
responses from “intact” coalition leaders (n=16) versus “dormant” coalition leaders 
(n=14).  
Procedures. When participants agreed to be part of the original study, 
confidentiality was not assured and in fact, identifying information was transparent to all 
who participated because participants expressed a desire to strengthen the network that 
had emerged through the research process. This transparency aided my effort to return to 
the original participants and interview them again. By the time I began my research, I had 
developed a personal and professional relationship with Terry Mizrahi, who then 
introduced me to Beth Rosenthal. They agreed to hand over all of the data and artifacts 
from their original study with the contingency that I would return them when finished and 
that we would collaborate in the future on our shared interests in coalitions and 
collaborations. 
 I began by reviewing the list of coalitions and coalition leaders that were 
represented in the original study. I began a search for the original participants by first 
using professional connections. Since Mizrahi and Rosenthal had relied in part on a 
“reputational” sample, they had pre-existing relationships with many of the participants. 
My first round of recruitment began by first eliminating the participants who had since 
passed away or who, because of deteriorating cognitive abilities or other reasons, could 
not ethically participate.  This process eliminated three potential participants. Of the 37 
who remained, I was able to locate approximately 10 participants through Terry Mizrahi, 
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who had provided email addresses and phone numbers. I used public information found 
through search engines (Google) and social media (Facebook and LinkedIn) to attempt to 
locate the remaining 27 participants. Of these 27, I found no public information on four 
potential participants. This narrowed my potential sample to 32 potential participants to 
whom I reached out via email, phone, or through private message via Facebook. I 
provided an introductory message, stating that I was doctoral student and friend of Terry 
Mizrahi and that I was interested in interviewing them for my work on coalitions. If I did 
not hear back after this initial outreach, I made a secondary contact. If I did not hear back 
after the secondary contact, I terminated attempts to recruit them, per BU IRB 
recommendations. Five previous participants did not respond, which narrowed my 
potential sample to 27. Two of the 27 participants agreed to participate but then rescinded 
their agreement which narrowed me to 25 potential participants. Two more potential 
participants responded to my outreach but refused to participate. My final sample 
consisted of 23 original participants (n=23).  
For those who responded to my initial outreach, I then employed a script (IRB 
approved) to explain the purpose of my study, the potential risks and benefits and their 
rights as a participant. I also informed them of the time that it would take to complete the 
interview (approximately 2-3 hours) and I also secured their consent to audio record my 
interviews for the purpose of transcription.  
For each participant, I offered to show my interview instrument prior to our 
interview. I also offered to come to them in person or to conduct the interview over the 
phone. Approximately half of the interviews were done in person and half over the 
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phone. Interviews took approximately two to three hours to complete. I found that 
interviews conducted in person resulted in richer qualitative data, as participants were 
more likely to elaborate on their responses.  
When each interview with one of the original participants was complete, I asked if 
they were comfortable referring me to a second person from their coalition who may be 
willing to be interviewed (snowball sample). This would allow me to compare responses 
from two participants from intact coalitions and to see how responses differed from the 
original participant leader to the current leader. I offered to give my contact information 
if they appeared uncomfortable providing the potential secondary participant’s 
information without prior consent. Overall, 12 of the 23 original participants provided me 
with a secondary potential participant’s name and/or contact information. I also asked the 
original participants if they were comfortable with me giving their name to the secondary 
person and all agreed.  
Because my interest was in interviewing a second participant from the coalitions 
which remained intact since the last study, my potential sample for the secondary group 
was 12 referrals (n=12). Of the 12 names I had acquired from the initial interviews, six 
were from coalitions which were still intact. Using public information from coalition’s 
websites or listing information, I was able to identify four leaders from the remaining 
coalitions. I reached out to all 10 potential participants via email, phone or through 
Facebook and/or LinkedIn. I provided the same introductory message and followed the 
same IRB protocol as with the initial group. If I did not get a response after a second 
contact, I terminated outreach. Four people did not respond after the secondary outreach 
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which brought my potential sample to six (n=6). For those who did not respond, I used 
public information to identify a second potential leader/participant (e.g. if the Executive 
Director did not respond, I attempted to identify a board member). Of the ten potential 
participants, three refused to participate, all citing time constraints. My final sample of 
secondary contacts from intact coalitions was seven participants (n=7).  
For each participant, I offered to show my interview instrument prior to our 
interview. I also offered to come to them in person or to conduct the interview over the 
phone. Six were conducted over the phone and one in-person. The process of recruiting 
and interviewing all participants (both original and secondary) took approximately two 
years. 
During all interviews, I conducted the interviews and asked the questions. I wrote 
participants’ responses in the questionnaire and tried to capture — verbatim and in 
writing — all of their quantitative responses. I made written notes of all qualitative 
responses. All interviews were recorded and transcribed in full, including all quantitative 
and qualitative responses. One recording was completely garbled and unusable. In 
instances of individual unintelligible responses, I returned to my written notes. This 
allowed me to fill in approximately 90% of the “gaps” that existed because of garbled 
recordings. The remaining 10% of unintelligible responses were treated as “no response”.  
Instrument Development  
 
The interview instrument was adapted from the one that Mizrahi and Rosenthal 
created in the original study. It is a 73-item questionnaire of both open and closed 
questions. Items that were used in the study that would be relevant for comparison were 
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maintained and additional items were added that addressed my specific research 
questions. Within the first five interviews that were conducted, participants organically 
made suggestions on items that I should add. These were added as suggestions were 
made. The result is that not all questions were answered by all participants. 
 The intended purpose of the questionnaire was to capture leaders’ perceptions of 
their coalitions (i.e., in your own words, how do you define coalition success?); however, 
the questionnaire also includes many questions on objective measures (i.e. what is the 
coalition’s operating budget?). Although these “objective” measures are captured, they 
are derived from the participant, and not independently verified.  
One of the early items in the questionnaire asks participants to state whether or 
not they consider their coalition to be successful (characterization of coalition). If they 
answered yes, a series of questions followed regarding their perceptions of coalition 
success. If they answered no, a series of questions followed regarding their perceptions of 
failure. If they answered somewhat, both series of questions were asked.  In early 
administrations of the survey, no participants considered their coalition to be a “failure” 
(this will be discussed in further detail later) and so the questions were eventually re-
worded to explore how well internal and environmental factors predicted dissolution, not 
necessarily failure. For this reason, responses were not captured for all coalitions that had 
dissolved 
Per the original study questionnaire, items in the interview were grouped under 
the following themes: participant information; coalition information; demographic 
information of working group, board and constituency; characterization of coalition; 
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internal predictors of failure/dissolution; environmental predictors of 
failure/dissolution; definition of failure/dissolution; political climate during 
failure/dissolution; social climate during failure/dissolution; political forces 
influencing failure/dissolution; events in the lifespan; benefits and drawback of 
permanency; target information; definition of success; internal predictors of success; 
environmental predictors of success; goals; strategies and tactics; decision-making 
processes; modes of communication; coalition resources; membership and 
participation; leadership; practice wisdom.  
Variables and Data Coding  
 
Participants were asked to respond to questions regarding participant information 
and coalition information. Additionally, they were asked to respond to items that 
addressed the aforementioned research questions. This section will provide detail on the 
variables under study and the specific instrument items that address those variables. 
Additionally, this section will provide detail on how those variables and items were 
analyzed.  
Participant information. Participants were asked to provide general 
demographic information about themselves, including how they identified according to 
sex/gender and race/ethnicity. These were open-ended questions and were categorized 
according to grounded theory methodology. Participants were also asked about their 
formal educational level and type of formal education they received. Participants were 
also asked to report on their total number of years in their coalition and the “highest” title 
they held within the coalition. Responses to these demographic questions are presented in 
 44 
Chapter Four. 
Coalition information. Participants were asked to provide general information 
about the coalition with which they were involved, including the year the coalition 
formed and year the coalition terminated (if terminated). These responses will be 
reported in actual years and in range (by years) with relevant means. 
Participants were also asked to briefly describe the work of their coalition, in their 
own words. These responses were transcribed and using grounded theory methodology, 
responses were reviewed and as themes emerged from the data, associated codes were 
developed. These codes were re-applied to the data and further refined into categories. 
Responses were also grouped into two sub-samples of responses from participants in 
intact coalitions and responses from coalitions that are dormant.   
Participants were asked to describe the type of coalition they were representing. 
They were encouraged to check all of the following choices that applied to their coalition: 
advocacy; service; serving member organizations; and/or serving a 
constituency/community. These responses were analyzed for frequencies.  
Participants were asked to describe who comprised the constituency of their 
coalition (if applicable), in their own words. These responses were transcribed and using 
grounded theory methodology, responses were reviewed and as themes emerged from the 
data, associated codes were developed. These codes were re-applied to the data and 
further refined into categories.  
Participants were also asked to describe in their own words, who comprised the 
working group of their coalition and how often the working group met. These responses 
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were grouped into categories. Frequencies were calculated from these responses.   
Participants were asked to describe who comprised the working group of their 
coalition, in their own words. These responses were transcribed and using grounded 
theory methodology, responses were reviewed and as themes emerged from the data, 
associated codes were developed. These codes were re-applied to the data and further 
refined into categories.  
Question 1: How do leaders define coalition success? Participants were asked 
to reflect on their personal and professional experience in coalition-building and in 
particular, on how they indicate, or define, coalition success. Using a Likert scale of 1-5 
(1 = of no importance; 3 = of some importance and 5 = of great importance), participants 
were asked to rank the following factors in terms of how important they were for 
indicating/defining coalition success: longevity, creating lasting networks, achieving 
goals, gaining recognition from the target, gaining community support, members 
learning new skills, having coalition members gain new consciousness and having 
community members gain new consciousness.  
Responses were analyzed and then grouped into two sub-samples of responses 
from participants in intact coalitions and responses from coalitions that are dormant.  
These sub-sample responses were also compared to detect any significant differences in 
mean responses.  
In addition to responded to the Likert scale items, participants were also asked to 
define coalition success in their own words. These responses were transcribed and using 
grounded theory methodology, responses were reviewed and as themes emerged from the 
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data, associated codes were developed. These codes were re-applied to the data and 
further refined into categories.  
Question 2: What internal and environmental factors predicted 
failure/dissolution, according to leaders? For the purpose of responding to Question 2, 
responses from the sub-sample of participants from dormant coalitions were analyzed 
along a number of dimensions.  
Using a Likert scale of 1-5 (1 = of no importance; 3 = of some importance and 5 = 
of great importance), participants were asked to rate the following internal factors in 
terms of how important they were for predicting failure/dissolution in their coalition 
[from this point, the term “failure” will be excluded from the discussion]: inadequate 
funding; inadequate staffing; loss of commitment to the coalition; personality conflicts; 
conflicts between staff and volunteers; incompetent leadership; inadequate leadership; 
inequitable decision-making structure; goal “drift”; diverging expectations among 
members; power imbalances; loss of accountability to constituency; inauthentic 
representation; and lack of trust. Responses were analyzed and grouped into two sub-
samples of responses from coalition participants that were still intact and responses from 
coalition participants that are dormant. 
In addition to Likert responses, participants were also asked to describe, in their 
own words, what other internal factors predicted dissolution. These responses were 
transcribed and using grounded theory methodology, responses were reviewed and as 
themes emerged from the data, associated codes were developed. These codes were re-
applied to the data and further refined into categories.  
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Next, using the same Likert scale, participants were asked to rate the following 
environmental factors in terms of how important they were for predicting dissolution in 
their coalition: lack of influence in the community, community climate of competition, 
community climate of distrust, pressure/opposition from other constituencies, changes in 
political climate, co-optation, goal changes, target changes, and unresponsive target.  
In addition to Likert responses, participants were also asked to describe, in their 
own words, what other environmental factors predicted dissolution. Participants were 
also asked to describe if there were major political forces that contributed to dissolution. 
These responses were transcribed and using grounded theory methodology, responses 
were reviewed and as themes emerged from the data, associated codes were developed. 
These codes were re-applied to the data and further refined into categories. Common 
themes that emerged from these responses were analyzed.  
Question 3: What internal features predict coalition success, as identified by 
leaders? Using a Likert scale of 1-5 (1 = of no importance; 3 = of some importance and  
5 = of great importance), participants were asked to rank the following internal factors in 
terms of how important they were for predicting success in the specific coalition that they 
were involved in: competent leadership; history of a positive working relationship within 
the coalition; equitable decision-making structure and process; adequate funding; 
adequate staffing; the “right” connections/contacts; broad-based membership; small, 
tightly bonded membership; members’ commitment to the coalition; members’ 
commitment to goals; trust amongst members; diversity; achieving small, interim 
victories; providing tangible benefits to member organizations; providing intangible 
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benefits to member organizations; having adequate time to address the issues; equitable 
division of labor; good operating structure; shared responsibility in the coalition; and 
open channels of communication within the coalition. Responses were also grouped into 
two sub-samples of responses from participants in intact coalitions and responses from 
coalitions that are dormant.  These sub-sample responses were also compared to detect 
any differences in mean responses.  
 In addition to the Likert items, participants were asked if there were any other 
internal factors which predicted success in their coalition. These responses were 
transcribed and using grounded theory methodology, responses were reviewed and as 
themes emerged from the data, associated codes were developed. These codes were re-
applied to the data and further refined into categories.  
Participants were asked to describe the demographic composition of their 
coalition’s working group to the greatest of their ability. Categories included gender, 
race/ethnicity, level of education and socioeconomic status.   
Participants were asked to reflect to their particular leadership 
qualities/characteristics and to “check all items that apply” to them as individual leaders: 
trained professional; came up from the ranks; proven credibility; trustworthy; uses the 
coalition to serve member organizations’ needs; opportunist; well connected to the 
external power structure; well connected to the constituency; organized; “good” 
manager; charismatic; visionary; “good” strategic political skills; “good” group 
facilitation skills; represents the coalition’s constituency; persistent; motivator; and 
agitator.  Responses were also grouped into two sub-samples of responses from 
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participants in intact coalitions and responses from coalitions that are dormant.  These 
sub-sample responses were also compared to detect any differences in responses.  
Participants were also asked to describe in their own words what other 
characteristics or attributes describe them as a leader. These responses were transcribed 
and using grounded theory methodology, responses were reviewed and as themes 
emerged from the data, associated codes were developed. These codes were re-applied to 
the data and further refined into categories.   
Participants were asked to, in their own words, describe the decision-making 
process within their coalition. These responses were transcribed and using grounded 
theory methodology, responses were reviewed and as themes emerged from the data, 
associated codes were developed. These codes were re-applied to the data and further 
refined into categories. Responses were also grouped into two sub-samples of responses 
from participants in intact coalitions and responses from coalitions that are dormant.  
These sub-sample responses were also compared to detect any differences in responses.  
Participants were also asked to respond to some items about events in the lifespan 
of the coalition. They were asked to “check all items that apply” to their particular 
coalition: if the coalition gained members; lost members; became dormant then 
resurrected; became a permanent organization; became a different coalition; developed 
and addressed new goals; changed mission; became absorbed by a permanent 
organization; and experienced mission drift. Frequencies were calculated from these 
responses.  Responses were also grouped into two sub-samples of responses from 
participants in intact coalitions and responses from coalitions that are dormant.  These 
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sub-sample responses were also compared to detect differences in responses.  
For participants whose coalition was or became a permanent organization, they 
were asked to describe in their own words, the benefits and drawbacks of that decision. 
These responses were transcribed and using grounded theory methodology, responses 
were reviewed and as themes emerged from the data, associated codes were developed. 
These codes were re-applied to the data and further refined into categories.  
Participants were asked to break down the coalition’s financial resources and 
allocate a percentage to each of the following choices, totaling 100%: member dues; in-
kind member contributions; public funding; private funding; fundraising; and sponsor 
organization. Participant responses were then grouped into two sub-samples of 
participants from intact and dormant coalitions and their responses were compared to 
detect any differences. Participants were also asked to give the approximate operating 
budget of their coalition. Participant responses were analyzed and then grouped into two 
sub-samples of “intact” and “dormant” participants and their responses were compared to 
detect any differences. 
Participants were also asked if, since the last study, the coalition had achieved its’ 
primary goals. Choices included yes; some, but not all; and no. Frequencies were 
calculated from these responses.  Responses were also grouped into two sub-samples of 
responses from participants in intact coalitions and responses from coalitions that are 
dormant.  These sub-sample responses were also compared to detect any significant 
differences in responses. 
Participants were asked to respond to a question about the past (if dormant) or 
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current (if intact) goals that the coalition addressed. Choices included: passing 
legislation; opposing legislation; influencing public opinion; electing public officials; 
defeating public officials; gaining funding; opposing funding cuts; creating new policies; 
opposing policy decisions; and other. Frequencies were calculated from these responses.  
Responses were also grouped into two sub-samples of responses from participants in 
intact coalitions and responses from coalitions that are dormant.  These sub-sample 
responses were also compared to detect any differences in responses. 
Participants were asked to respond to a question about whether the goals of the 
coalition had changed since the last study and/or since the time of their involvement. 
Choices included: goals did not change and goals changed.  Responses were also 
grouped into two sub-samples of responses from participants in intact coalitions and 
responses from coalitions that are dormant.  These sub-sample responses were also 
compared to detect any differences in responses.   
Participants were asked to describe the strategies or tactics utilized by the 
coalition and were encouraged to “check all that apply” to the following: consensus 
through education, persuasion and/or collaboration; negotiation using incentives and/or 
threats; and/or conflict using demonstrations, civil disobedience and/or extra-legal 
tactics. Frequencies were calculated from these responses.  Responses were also grouped 
into two sub-samples of responses from participants in intact coalitions and responses 
from coalitions that are dormant.  These sub-sample responses were also compared to 
detect any differences in responses. 
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Question 4: What environmental features predict coalition success, as 
identified by leaders? Using a Likert scale of 1-5 (1 = of no importance; 3 = of some 
importance and 5 = of great importance), participants were asked to rank the following 
environmental factors in terms of how important they were for predicting success in the 
specific coalition that they were involved in: having no opposing 
organizations/coalitions; addressing a critical issue; the “right” timing; that the 
community climate was open to the work of the coalition; that the coalition chose an 
appropriate target; the target was responsive; open channels of communication outside 
of the coalition; broad-based network; gatekeeper access; having working relationships 
with non-member organizations; having working relationships with non-member elected 
officials; and having working relationships with other non-member individuals.  
Responses were analyzed and grouped into two sub-samples of responses from 
participants from intact coalitions and responses from coalitions that are dormant.  These 
sub-sample responses were also compared to detect any differences in mean responses.  
In addition to the Likert items, participants were asked if there were any other 
environmental factors which predicted success in their coalition. These responses were 
transcribed and using grounded theory methodology, responses were reviewed and as 
themes emerged from the data, associated codes were developed. These codes were re-
applied to the data and further refined into categories.  
 Participants were also asked to describe the target(s) of their coalition. Choices 
included: legislative body; elected leaders; public administration; court/justice system; 
specific community; specific constituency; and corporate/private entity. Frequencies were 
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calculated from these responses.  Responses were also grouped into two sub-samples of 
responses from participants in intact coalitions and responses from coalitions that are 
dormant.  These sub-sample responses were also compared to detect any differences.  
Participants were also asked to describe the relationship between the coalition 
and its’ primary target. Choices included cooperative, adversarial, reluctantly mutual and 
other. Frequencies were calculated from these responses.  Responses were also grouped 
into two sub-samples of responses from participants in intact coalitions and responses 
from coalitions that are dormant.  These sub-sample responses were also compared to 
detect any differences. 
Participants were also asked to say yes or no to the following: if their coalition 
worked cooperatively with other coalitions; if they worked cooperatively with any 
organizations that were not part of the coalition; and if they worked cooperatively with 
any elected leaders or public officials. Frequencies were calculated from these responses.  
Responses were also grouped into two sub-samples of responses from participants in 
intact coalitions and responses from coalitions that are dormant.  These sub-sample 
responses were also compared to detect any differences. 
Question 5: How does social capital theory explain coalition success? 
Individual items related to social capital predictors were pulled from the questionnaire. 
Specifically, items related to the structural dimensions of social capital were analyzed, 
including the structure of the coalition itself and the networks within which it is 
embedded; and the presence of relationships within the coalition, including the strength 
and stability of those ties. The following specific items were included: definition of 
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success items – longevity and creating lasting networks; internal condition for success – 
equitable decision-making structure; small, tightly-bonded membership; broad-based 
membership; good operating structure; and clear channels of communication within the 
coalition; external conditions for success – clear channels of communication outside the 
coalition; broad-based network; gatekeeper access; and the decision-making 
process/structure. 
The relational dimensions of social capital were also analyzed and items were 
pulled related to how relationships within the coalition or network and the endurance of 
the coalition and network are influenced by respect, trust (or lack thereof), acceptance, 
shared norms, obligations, commitment, participation, and diversity. The following 
specific items were included: predictors of dissolution - loss of commitment; personality 
conflicts; power imbalances; loss of trust and community climate of distrust; internal 
conditions of success – history of positive working relationship; the “right” connections; 
members’ commitment to coalition;, members’ commitment to goal; mutual respect and 
trust amongst members; and diversity; external conditions for success - working 
relationships with non-member organizations; working relationships with non-member 
elected officials and working relationships with other non-member individuals; whether 
coalition leaders are paid by the coalition, paid by a member organization or volunteer; 
and parameters for membership. 
Lastly, the cognitive dimensions of social capital were analyzed, and items were 
pulled related to shared values and visions, collective self-interest and the expectation of 
mutual reciprocity. The following specific items were included: functions/benefits that 
 55 
the coalition offers its members. Participants were also asked to describe, in their own 
words, factors that sustain commitment to the coalition and factors that decrease 
participation in the coalition. As themes emerged from the data, associated codes were 
developed. These codes were re-applied to the data and further refined into categories.  
With the exception of the factors that sustain commitment and decrease 
participation, means and frequencies were calculated for all aforementioned items. 
Responses were also grouped into two sub-samples of responses from participants in 
intact coalitions and responses from coalitions that are dormant.  These sub-sample 
responses were also compared to detect any differences. 
Question 6: What are the specific political, fiscal and social conditions that 
influenced the development and lifespan of the coalitions under study?  
Participants were asked to describe, in their own words, the political climate at 
the point of dissolution as well as the social climate at the point of dissolution. They were 
also asked if, to their knowledge, there were any major political forces that directly 
contributed to the dissolution of their coalition, and if so, to describe that political force. 
These responses were transcribed and using grounded theory methodology, responses 
were reviewed and as themes emerged from the data, associated codes were developed. 
These codes were re-applied to the data and further refined into categories.  
Full transcripts were mined for phrases and themes related to the political, fiscal 
and social climate from approximately 1975 – 2014. Mining included a search for 
references to specific elected or appointed officials, legislative bodies, administrative 
bodies, partisan effects, economic conditions and the general zeitgeist. As themes 
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emerged from the data, associated codes were developed. These codes were re-applied to 
the data and further refined into categories.  
A brief historical analysis was also conducted, examining the political, fiscal and 
social conditions that affected the coalitions under study, with a focus on the conditions 
in New York City, from 1975 to 2014. This brief overview will provide a historical 
context for participant responses.  
Question 7: How can the practice knowledge of these seasoned leaders 
contribute to the body of knowledge on coalition-building? Participants from the 
original study were asked to reflect on the 25-plus years of coalition-building they have 
participated in. Specifically, they were asked the following three questions: How has 
coalition-building changed over the last 25 years? What lessons have you learned about 
coalitions over the last 25 years? And what has kept you active in coalitions over the last 
25 years? These responses were transcribed and using grounded theory methodology, 
responses were reviewed and as themes emerged from the data, associated codes were 
developed. These codes were re-applied to the data and further refined into categories.  
In addition to data gathered from these qualitative responses, full transcripts were 
reviewed to uncover any themes that were not explicitly addressed in the questionnaire 
but may have arisen as participants elaborated on their responses. As themes emerged 
from the data, associated codes were developed. These codes were re-applied to the data 
and further refined into categories. 
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Data Analysis 
Descriptive statistics for quantitative data. All Likert items and closed 
responses were analyzed for relevant frequencies and means. Initially I had intended to 
use SPSS to analyze for statistically significant correlations; however, because my total 
sample (N=30) just barely met the criteria for a “robust” sample, I found that when a) not 
all respondents answered a particular question or when b) the sample was broken up into 
sub-groups for comparison, SPSS indicated that the number of responses was too small to 
statistically analyze. Thus, all comparisons of means and frequencies discussed in the 
results and discussion section are not meant to indicate statistical significance. Instead, I 
utilized Mattesich and Monsey’s (1993) interpretation of scores, using 4.0 as a baseline 
for significance and less than 2.9 as insignificant.  
Grounded theory methodology for qualitative data. My analysis of the 
qualitative data followed grounded theory methodology, first by doing an initial open-
coding of the data without pre-supposed theoretical concepts. Analysis was performed 
“incident-by-incident” (versus line-by-line) to generate broad categories of data 
(Charmaz, 2006). Initial sub-categories were also developed during this phase of analysis. 
Next, a more focused level of coding was developed by taking the most frequent codes 
from the first stage and reapplying them to the data. These codes were re-applied and 
often re-named to ensure that the data were attended to, to the greatest degree possible. 
Detailed analysis of items by research question is discussed below. 
Human Subjects and Data Quality  
During all stages of research, IRB protocol was followed. Although participants 
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were not guaranteed confidentiality in the original study, I assured confidentiality in mine 
and followed Boston University IRB guidelines.  In order to ensure confidentiality, each 
participant was assigned a numerical ID. A master list was created with names, 
identifying information and associated IDs that only I have access to. That list was kept 
in a locked file. Subsequently, only participant IDs were written on all documents, with 
no other identifying information.  
As part of my interview process and commitment to participatory research, I 
asked all participants if they would like to be contacted to receive a copy of my work 
once completed. All participants said yes, which means I will return to that master list in 
order to distribute my final dissertation. Once it has been distributed, the master list will 
be destroyed. 
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CHAPTER 4: DESCRIPTION OF STUDY SAMPLE: PARTICIPANTS AND 
COALITIONS 
This chapter will provide an overview of both study participants as well as the 
coalitions themselves. Findings will be presented in aggregate, including all participant 
responses. Given that the literature is lacking any type of comparative analysis, responses 
will be compared across two sub-groups: participant responses from coalitions which are 
intact against participant responses from coalitions which are dormant. The original 
intention was to compare responses from successful coalitions against failed coalitions. 
Although no participants characterized their coalition as a failure, they did respond to and 
discuss factors that contributed to dissolution. Theoretically and practically, coalitions 
dissolve as planned, when goals have been achieved, others (as will be discussed) 
dissolve because of factors which hinder the coalitions to achieve goals and other 
measures of success. These findings suggest that “intact” and “dormant” sub-group 
responses serve as an interesting and appropriate comparison. 
Participant descriptions will include basic demographic information, including 
sex/gender and race/ethnicity, in addition to type and level of formal education. It will 
also include information regarding participants’ tenure with the coalition. Coalition 
descriptions will include the lifespan, work and type of coalition as well as descriptions 
of coalition’s constituency, working group and the frequency of their interactions.  
Participant Information 
Participants were asked to provide general demographic information about 
themselves, including how they identified according to sex/gender and race/ethnicity. 
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Participants were also asked about their formal educational level and type of formal 
education they received.  Participants were also asked to report on their total number of 
years in their coalition and the “highest” title they held within the coalition.  
 The following table provides details for the entire sample (N=30) as well as 
details from the original participant leaders (N=23) and current participant leaders (N=7). 
All participant demographic information is self-identified. 
Sex/gender. The total sample is comprised of slightly more women (53.3%) than 
men, with slightly more men in the original sub-sample (52.2%) and significantly more 
women in the second sub-sample (71.4%).  
Race/ethnicity. The vast majority of all participants indicated that they self-
identify as White and/or Caucasian (76.6%), with even higher identification under this 
category in the second sub-sample (85.7%). Approximately the same number of 
participants identified as Black and/or African American across the total sample and sub-
sample (13-14.3%). One participant self-identified in each of the following categories: 
mixed-race, Asian-American and member of the Ethical Human Society. 
Education level and experience. Educational level varied, but all participants 
had at least some college experience, and approximately 40% (39.1-42.9%) of the total 
sample and each sub-sample had a master’s degree. Approximately one-third (24.6-
34.8%) of the entire sample and each sub-sample had a doctorate – either a PhD or JD. 
The educational experiences of participants varied, but social work (23.3%) and law 
(13.3%) were identified most often across the entire sample. See Table 1 on the following 
page for detailed participant demographic information. Participant data is presented in 
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total, along with a comparison of original participants and newly recruited participants, as 
the recruitment process and positionality of researcher and participant should be 
considered (Muhammad, Wallerstein, Sussman, Avila, Belone and Duran, 2014), 
especially when the variable of diversity is analyzed. Further discussion on reflexivity 
will continue in Chapter 8.  
 Table 1: Frequencies and Percentages of Participant Demographics  
 Total Sample 
N (%) 
Original Participant 
Leaders N (%) 
Current Participant 
Leaders N (%) 
Sex/Gender:  
Male/man 
Female/woman 
No response  
 
14 (46.6) 
16 (53.3) 
 0 (0) 
 
12 (52.2) 
11 (47.8) 
0 (0) 
 
2 (28.6) 
5 (71.4) 
0 (0) 
Race/Ethnicity 
White/Caucasian [Jewish] 
Black/African American 
Mixed Race 
Asian American 
Ethical Human Society 
No response   
 
23[2] (76.6) 
4 (13.3) 
1 (3.3) 
1 (3.3) 
1 (3.3) 
0 (0) 
 
17[2] (73.9) 
3 (13.0) 
1 (4.3) 
1 (4.3) 
1 (4.3) 
0 (0) 
 
6 (85.7) 
1 (14.3) 
0 (0) 
0 (0) 
0 (0) 
0 (0) 
Education Level:  
Some college 
Bachelor’s degree 
Master’s degree 
Doctorate 
No response  
 
1 (3.3) 
3 (10) 
12 (40) 
10 (33.3) 
4 (13.3) 
 
1 (4.3) 
1 (4.3) 
9 (39.1) 
8 (34.8) 
4 (30.4) 
 
0 (0) 
2 (28.6) 
3 (42.9) 
2 (28.6) 
0 (0) 
Education Type: 
African Studies 
Anthropology   
Divinity 
Education 
Fashion 
Law 
Nursing 
Philosophy  
Political Science 
Psychology 
Psychiatry/Neuropsych. 
Public Administration 
Public Policy    
Social Work 
Urban Studies 
No type indicated  
 
1 (3.3) 
1 (3.3) 
1 (3.3) 
1 (3.3) 
0 (0) 
4 (13.3) 
1 (3.3) 
1 (3.3) 
1 (3.3) 
1 (3.3) 
2 (6.7) 
1 (3.3) 
1 (3.3) 
7 (23.3) 
1 (3.3) 
6 (20) 
 
0 (0) 
1 (4.3) 
1 (4.3) 
1 (4.3) 
0 (0) 
3 (13) 
1 (4.3) 
1 (4.3) 
1 (4.3) 
1 (4.3) 
2 (8.7) 
0 (0) 
1 (4.3) 
7 (30.4) 
0 (0) 
5 (21.8) 
 
1 (14.3) 
0 (0) 
0 (0) 
0 (0) 
1 (14.3) 
1 (14.3) 
0 (0) 
0 (0) 
0 (0) 
1 (14.3) 
0 (0) 
1 (14.3) 
0 (0) 
0 (0) 
1 (14.3) 
1 (14.3) 
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Participant years of experience. Overall, participants had a great deal of 
experience within the coalition they represented with exactly half of the entire sample 
indicating over ten years of experience within their respective coalition. More than one-
fifth (23.3%) of the entire sample had over 20 years of experience. The secondary sub-
sample indicated significantly longer experience within their coalition, with 85.7% 
indicating they had over ten years of experience, while just over one-third (39.1%) of the 
original sub-sample had over ten years of experience, within their coalition.  
Participant titles. Because participants were specifically targeted as leaders of 
the coalition, they indicated relatively “high” titles within their respective coalitions, with 
one-third of the entire sample indicating they were considered Executive Directors, while 
16.7% of participants indicated they were Founders of their respective coalition. As 
expected, no participants in the secondary sub-sample indicated themselves as Founders. 
See Table 2 on the following page for more information. 
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Table 2: Frequencies of Participant Experience  
 Total 
Sample 
N (%) 
Original 
Participant 
Leaders      
N (%) 
New 
Participant 
Leaders  
N (%) 
Duration of participation in             
coalition of study: 
 0 – 5 years 
 6 – 10 years 
 11 – 20 years 
 Over 20 years 
 No response 
 
 
7 (23.3) 
4 (13.3) 
8 (26.7) 
7 (23.3) 
4 (13.3) 
 
 
6 (26.1) 
4 (17.4) 
4 (17.4) 
5 (21.7) 
4 (17.4) 
 
 
1 (14.3) 
0 (0) 
4 (57.1) 
2 (28.6) 
0 (0) 
“Highest” title within 
coalition: 
 Executive Director 
 Assistant/Co-Director 
 Director  
 President  
 Chairperson  
 Co-chairperson  
 Staff 
 Organizer 
 No official title 
 Founder* 
 No response 
 
10 (33.3) 
2 (6.6) 
4 (13.3) 
1 (3.3) 
3 (1) 
2 (6.6) 
1 (3.3) 
1 (3.3) 
2 (6.6) 
5 (16.7) 
4 (6.6)  
 
8 (34.8) 
2 (8.7) 
2 (8.7) 
1 (4.3) 
3 (13) 
2 (8.7) 
1 (4.3) 
0 (0) 
1 (4.3) 
5 (21.7) 
4 (17.4)  
 
2 (28.6) 
1 (14.3) 
2 (28.6) 
0 (0) 
0 (0) 
0 (0) 
0 (0) 
1 (14.3) 
1 (14.3) 
0 (0) 
0 (0)  
 * Participants may indicate Founder and another title   
 
Coalition Information 
Participants were asked to provide general information about the coalition with 
which they were involved, including the year the coalition formed and year the coalition 
terminated (if terminated). Participants were also asked to briefly describe the type of 
coalition they were representing. They were encouraged to check all of the following 
choices that applied to their coalition: advocacy; service; serving member organizations; 
and/or serving a constituency/community. Participants were asked to describe who 
comprised the constituency of their coalition (if applicable), in their own words and to 
describe who comprised the working group of their coalition, in their own words. Lastly, 
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participants were asked to report how often the working group met as well as how often 
the entire coalition met.  
 Years of coalition formation and termination. All of the coalitions under study 
were formed between 1975 and 1990 and on average were formed around 1981. The 
coalitions under study terminated between 1980 and 2014. Coalitions lasted anywhere 
between one and 30 years. 
Type of coalition. Twenty-one of the 23 coalitions (91.3%) did advocacy work. 
Of those who stated that their coalition did advocacy work, 40% described their 
coalition’s advocacy work as serving member organizations, while 20% stated that their 
coalition’s advocacy work served a greater constituency. Forty percent of participants 
stated that their coalition’s advocacy work served both member organizations and a 
greater constituency.  
Seventeen of the 23 coalitions (74%) did strictly advocacy work while five 
(21.7%) did both advocacy work and service provision. Only two coalitions under study 
(8.7%) provided strictly services, and these were both to a greater constituency.  
Constituency. Of the 23 coalitions under study, 20 participants responded to the 
question of who comprised the working group. Ten coalitions (50%) served a coalition 
based on issue (i.e domestic violence, poverty, hunger). Six coalitions (30%) served a 
constituency based on geography (i.e. Long Island, Harlem, South Bronx) while three 
coalitions (15%) served a constituency based on identity (i.e. women, older adults, 
students in public schools). 
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Working group. Of the 23 coalitions under study, 21 participants responded to 
the question of who comprised the working group. Twelve of these coalitions’ (57.1%) 
working groups were/are comprised of representatives from member organizations. Five 
coalitions’ (23.8%) working groups were/are comprised of a board of directors in 
conjunction with paid staff. Two (9.5%) coalitions’ working groups were/are comprised 
of a combination of a board of directors, paid staff, community members and 
representatives from member organizations. One (4.8%) coalition’s working groups is 
comprised of just a board of directors and one (4.8%) coalition’s working group is 
comprised of just community members.  
Frequency of working group interaction. Of the 20 participants who responded 
to this question, ten (50%) stated that the working group of their coalition met once a 
month, while six (30%) said that their coalition met less than once a month, typically 
quarterly. Two participants each (20%) said that their coalitions met every day and as 
needed, respectively.  
Frequency of entire coalition interaction. Of the 19 participants who responded 
to this question, seven (36.8%) stated that their entire coalition met quarterly, while five 
(26.3%) stated that the entire coalition met annually. Five additional participants (26.3%) 
said that their entire coalition came together only for events or demonstrations while two 
participants (15.8%) said the entire coalition was invited to participate in all coalition 
meetings and activities.  
These findings suggest that the work of the coalitions under study varies greatly, 
although all could be considered as having social change aims. Furthermore, these 
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demographic findings suggest that participants come from a wide variety of backgrounds 
and disciplines. The diversity of participants and their respective coalitions will be 
discussed further in detail, as will interesting sub-group comparisons.  
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CHAPTER 5: INTERNAL PREDICTORS OF COALITION SUCCESS 
This chapter will highlight findings from the current study as it relates to 
understanding coalition success, including related theoretical assumptions and 
implications. Findings will include a discussion of how leaders define coalition success 
as well as internal predictors of coalition success. Findings will be presented for all 
participant responses and then by comparison of participant responses from intact versus 
dormant coalitions.  
Definition of Success 
Currently, there is no general consensus on a theoretical framework for defining 
coalition success, with the exceptions of the frameworks developed by Mattesich and 
Monsey (1993), Mizrahi and Rosenthal (1993) in the original study and one by Wolff 
(2001). The current study utilized that framework in asking participants to reflect on their 
personal and professional experience in coalition-building and in particular, on how they 
indicate, or define, coalition success. Using a Likert scale of 1-5 (low to high 
importance), participants were asked to rank the following factors in terms of how 
important they were for defining coalition success: longevity, creating lasting networks, 
achieving goals, gaining recognition from the target, gaining community support, 
learning new skills, having coalition members gain new consciousness and having 
community members gain new consciousness. See Table 3 on the following page for a 
summary. 
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        Table 3:  Mean Definition of Success Scores* 
Achieving goals 4.33 
Community gaining new consciousness 4.12 
Gaining community support 4.04 
Creating lasting networks 3.96 
Gaining recognition from the target 3.88 
Members learning new skills 3.74 
Members gaining new consciousness 3.62 
Longevity 3.22 
              * Items scored from 1-5, with 5 representing high importance (N=30) 
 
Because the research on how coalition success is still in the exploratory stages, I 
also asked participants were asked to define coalition success in their own words, in 
addition to structured items described above.  Most participants gave complex and varied 
responses so that multiple definitions were given. Five strong themes and ultimately 
categories emerged.  
Of the twenty-five participants who responded to this question, 14 (56%) defined 
coalition success as bringing people together. For example, one participant stated that 
coalition success is “bringing together groups that will profit from working together” 
while another said that coalition success is defined as “a group of people who come 
together for a common goal and common purpose that is able to work cooperatively”. A 
third defined coalition success partially by being able to “maintain a good turnout”. 
Thirteen participants (52%) said that coalition success is defined by achieving 
goals. Participants used a variety of phrases to describe this. In addition to the key words 
“achieving goals”, participants also said that coalition success is defined by 
“accomplishing goals”, “achieving what you set out to do”, “achieving the bottom line” 
and “achieving objectives.” 
Seven participants (28%) defined coalition success as raising awareness or 
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visibility. For example, one participant said that coalition success is defined by “getting 
people to think differently about an issue” while another said that it’s about “creating new 
awareness in the community about the need for change and how that change can take 
place. A third participant defined coalition success as “getting across a message”. Six 
participants (24%) stated that coalition success was acting as an agent of change. One 
participant, for example, said that coalition success is defined by “the ability to bring 
people in and change the relations of power and make real improvements in people’s 
lives.” Another said that success is “moving issues and transforming lives”. 
Four participants (16%) defined coalition success as leveraging political power. 
One participant, for example, defined coalition success as “creating new political 
possibilities” while another said that it’s “when we are able to influence policies, rules 
and regulations in a way that’s beneficial [to the constituency].” One participant each 
(4%) defined coalition success as being flexible; creating clear goals and strategies; and 
achieving small victories.  
Overall, this study confirms what Mizrahi and Rosenthal found in their original 
study – that achieving goals is one of the most important definitions of coalition success. 
Additionally, findings show that a more nuanced definition of coalition success is 
warranted.  Specifically, the qualitative responses suggest that “bringing people together” 
should be included in future examinations of defining coalition success. More detailed 
analysis of changes in how the original participants now define success will be discussed 
in Chapter 7.  
When broken into comparison groups of leader responses from intact versus 
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dormant coalitions, strong differences in mean responses emerged. See Table 4 for a 
summary of the comparison. 
Table 4: Comparison of Mean Definition of Success Scores by 
Intact Coalition Leaders and Dormant Coalition Leaders * 
 Intact 
Coalition 
Leaders  
Dormant 
Coalition 
Leaders 
Diff. 
Achieving goals 4.64 4.00 .64 
Community gaining new consciousness 4.54 3.96 .58 
Gaining community support 4.07 4.00 .07 
Creating lasting networks 4.21 3.69 .52 
Gaining recognition from the target 3.76 4.00 .24 
Members learning new skills 4.29 3.15 1.14 
Members gaining new consciousness  4.23 3.00 1.23 
Longevity  3.71 2.69 1.02 
Mean difference .68 
       * Items scored from 1-5, with 5 representing high importance (N=30) 
 
Interestingly, the greatest differences in how participants define coalition success are 
around member benefits and longevity. From a social capital standpoint, these member 
benefits are seen as a cognitive dimension and as such, it may be that participants from 
intact coalitions more effectively understand that in order for coalitions to endure, 
members must perceive that they will benefit. These differences and findings are 
consistent with previous findings explaining member commitment and coalition success 
(Leanna & Van Buren, 1993; Matteisch & Monsey, 1993; Watson & Papamarcos, 2002). 
Unsurprisingly, participants from intact coalitions rated longevity much higher, 
although neither group rated that item relatively high. Consistent with previous findings 
from Mizrahi and Rosenthal, these findings suggest that coalition leaders do not define 
the success of their coalitions by how long they last.  
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Internal Predictors of Coalition Success 
  The literature on organizations, coalitions and collaborations suggests that a 
number of factors contribute to the success of coalitions. Using a Likert scale of 1-5 
participants were asked to rank the following internal factors in terms of how important 
they were for predicting success in the specific coalition that they were involved in: 
competent leadership; history of a positive working relationship within the coalition; 
equitable decision-making structure and process; adequate funding;, adequate staffing; 
broad-based membership; small, tightly bonded membership; members’ commitment to 
the coalition; members’ commitment to goals; trust amongst members; diversity; 
providing tangible benefits to member organizations; providing intangible benefits to 
member organizations; equitable division of labor; good operating structure; shared 
responsibility in the coalition; and open channels of communication within the coalition. 
See Table 5 on the following page for a summary of mean scores. These variables will be 
discussed in greater detail throughout the chapter.  
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Table 5: Mean Internal Predictors of Success Scores* 
Competent leadership 4.72 
Clear channels of communication within the coalition  4.58 
Mutual respect and trust amongst coalition members 4.27 
Members’ commitment to the coalition  4.21 
Adequate staffing 4.00 
Good operating structure 3.87 
Adequate funding  3.84 
Members’ commitment to coalition goals 3.69 
Equitable decision-making structure 3.68 
Providing tangible benefits to members 3.66 
History of positive working relationship 3.50 
Broad-based membership 3.48 
Diversity 3.46 
Providing intangible benefits to members 3.22 
Small, tightly-bonded membership 2.62 
Shared responsibility within the coalition 2.56 
Equitable division of labor 2.50 
 *Items scored 1-5, with 5 representing the highest importance (N=30) 
 
When broken in to comparison groups of leader responses from intact versus dormant 
coalitions, interesting differences in mean responses emerged. See Table 6 on the 
following page for a summary of the comparison. 
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Table 6: Comparison of Mean Internal Predictors of Success Scores By Intact 
Coalition Leaders and Dormant Coalition Leaders*  
 Intact 
Coalition 
Leaders  
Dormant 
Coalition 
Leaders 
Diff. 
Clear channels of communication within the coalition 4.57 4.58 .01 
Competent leadership 4.54 4.92 .38 
Adequate staffing 4.31 3.67 .64 
Mutual respect and trust amongst members 4.21 4.33 .12 
Adequate funding 4.19 3.46 .73 
Good operating structure 4.18 3.50 .68 
Members’ commitment to goals 4.11 4.33 .22 
History of a positive working relationship 3.96 3.00 .96 
Equitable decision-making structure  3.78 3.58 .20 
Providing tangible benefits to members 3.71 3.58 .13 
Diversity 3.64 3.25 .39 
Members’ commitment to coalition 3.43 4.00 .57 
Broad-based membership 3.36 3.63 .27 
Providing intangible benefits to members 3.20 3.25 .05 
Shared responsibility within the coalition 2.77 2.33 .44 
Small, tightly-bonded membership 2.71 2.50 .21 
Equitable division of labor  2.50 2.50 0 
Mean difference  .35 
        *Items scored 1-5, with 5 representing the highest importance (N=30) 
 
This section will highlight the findings related to the internal predictors of 
success, including impetus to form and coalition purpose; goal-setting, identification of 
target and strategy; internal resources; leadership; power and decision-making; 
coalition structure; member contributions; diversity; and relationships – including 
aspects of respect, trust, communication and commitment.  
Impetus to form and coalition purpose. Because the original study asked 
participants to describe how and why their coalition coalesced, and because this study 
only included coalitions that had been included in the previous study, participants were 
not asked to describe this again. Participants were, however, asked to describe the 
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purpose of their coalitions’ work, an important question that allows potential members to 
assess whether or not they have the capacity and desire to collaborate (Rosenthal, 
Greenawalt, Ivery & Mizrahi, 2016; Sowa, 2009; Wolff, 2001), Responses were grouped 
into non-mutually exclusive categories.  
Of 19 participants who responded to this question, nine (47.4%) described their 
coalition as working to promote community participation. For example, one participant 
stated that the work of his coalition was to “engage in more broad community 
organizing” while another said that the aim was to “inform the community about services 
that were being proposed and rally the community to support those services.” 
Seven participants (36.8%) described their coalitions’ work to address specific 
social issues; for example, one participant said that his coalition worked “to end hunger 
in New York State, including its root causes – primarily poverty.” Another stated that his 
coalition worked to “bring together a breadth of organizations to work together on core 
issues of economic and social justice.” Another participant stated that her coalition was 
comprised of “different agencies [who] came together to talk about the issue of teen 
pregnancy.”  
Seven participants (36.8%) also described their coalitions’ work as political 
advocacy. One participant, for example, stated that his coalition’s “basic purpose was to 
advocate for an increase in the state supplement to the SSI [Social Security Income]” 
while another said that his coalition did “policy advocacy work around poverty and 
hunger”. A third participant stated that her coalition did “advocacy for member 
organizations… to be the eyes and ears in the government arena and to let kids and 
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families know that they can have a voice in the decision-making.” 
Five participants (26.3%) stated that their coalition worked to coordinate people 
and efforts.  One participant, for example, stated that his coalition’s aim was to “create a 
progressive network in which we try to bring together progressive organizations to 
facilitate communication, coordination and joint activity.” Another participant described 
his coalition as a “council [where] everybody would get together to identify issues and 
create strategies to address those issues.”  
Three participants (15.8%) stated that the work of their coalition was to prevent 
an action. Two of these three participants’ coalitions worked to prevent commercial 
development and the third worked to prevent the closure of a bank in a neighborhood that 
was resource scarce.  
Two participants (10.5%) described the work of their coalition as providing 
services. For example, one participant said that his coalition did “some direct service 
related to prescreening for food stamps and outreach on school breakfasts and summer 
meal programs” while the other said her coalition formed to “address the needs of women 
affected by domestic violence.” 
 Two participants (10.5%) described the work of their coalition as 
assessing/documenting need. For example, one participant stated that his coalition did 
“the research needed to document a different set of services to go into a facility for 
vendor services that were being proposed by the state and federal government” while the 
other said that his coalition “documented the impact of the Reagan agenda – specifically 
the Hunger Study.” 
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When leader responses from intact versus dormant coalitions were examined, 
differences in responses emerged. Frequency reports are of percentages of total responses 
in sub-sample. See the Table 7 for a summary of the comparison. 
Table 7: Comparison of the Purpose of Coalitions by Intact Coalition Leaders and 
Dormant Coalition Leaders *  
 Intact Coalition 
Leaders (%) 
Dormant Coalition 
Leaders (%) 
Diff. 
Promote community participation  25 28.6 3.6 
Address specific social issues  37.5 7.1 30.4 
Political advocacy  12.5 35.7 23.2 
Coordinate people and efforts 25 7.1 17.9 
Prevent an action 0 21.4 21.4 
Provide a service  6.3 7.1 .8 
Assess/document need  6.3 7.1 .8 
Mean percentage difference  14.0 
* Percentage of “yes” responses (N=30) 
 
Participants from intact coalitions more often said that their coalition addressed specific 
social issues and coordinated people and efforts. On the other hand, participants from 
dormant coalition said their coalitions more often advocated politically and/or prevented 
an action. Intuitively, these differences may be explained by the associated targets and 
strategies associated with those actions. In other words, it may be that coalitions are most 
likely to go dormant when demonstrating political advocacy and/or preventing an action 
because the targets and related strategies are more likely to be adversarial and/or time-
limited. Further research is needed to examine the specific interplay between these 
variables.  
Goal-setting, identification of target and strategy. Participants were asked to 
respond to a question about the past (if dormant) or current (if intact) goals that the 
coalition addressed. As Rog and colleagues (2004) and Mattesich and Monsey (1993), 
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note, goals should be clearly articulated, concrete and attainable. Moreover, this process 
should occur early in coalition formation and should be bottom-up (Wolff, 2001). None 
of the coalition leaders described having inward-facing goals and/or goals that did not - at 
least partially- target an external entity. This is important because whether or not a 
coalition has inward-facing goals and/or outward-facing goals informs the mechanisms of 
social capital that will be most important for each coalition to foster in order to achieve 
success. In other words, we would expect that coalitions with inward-facing goals would 
need to capitalize on the bonding mechanisms of social capital, while a coalition with 
outward-facing goals would need to capitalize on bridging to other entities in the 
environment (Putnam, 2000). Thus, empirically, goals, identification of targets and 
strategies, and related social capital assumptions should and will be discussed as 
environmental predictors.  
Internal resources. Intuitively, it seems that internal funding is an important 
aspect of coalition success, although Wolff (2001) suggested otherwise as do the 
participants from the original Mizrahi and Rosenthal study. As Wolff notes, in-kind 
resources are more important than tangible monies, although this is articulated from a 
practice-based perspective, where coalitions are often forced to operate without any 
internal financial resources. Theoretically, it would seem that coalitions could do more 
with more.  
In this study, participants were asked to breakdown the coalition’s financial 
resources and allocate a percentage to each of the following choices, totaling 100%: 
member dues; in-kind member contributions; public funding; private funding; 
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fundraising; and sponsor organization. The following percentages are indicative of those 
sources which provided a majority of the coalitions’ resources (50% or greater). Of the 
26 participants who responded to this question, five stated that 100% of their coalition’s 
resources came from in-kind contributions, while one other participant stated that 70% of 
resources came from in-kind contributions. A small percentage of resources were derived 
from member dues (0-15% for all coalitions). 
Participants were also asked to provide, in dollar amounts, the operating budget 
for their coalition. Responses ranged from $0-$5 million. The average operating budget 
was $694,200. See Table 8 for a summary of response frequencies.   
Table 8: Average Operating Budgets* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Number of “yes” responses (N=23) 
 
The data suggest that coalitions can operate with a wide range of internal budgets. 
As the aforementioned table shows, the majority of coalitions operate with no operating 
budget whatsoever, while others operate with multi-million dollar internal budgets. Given 
that all participants perceive their coalitions to be at least partially successfully, this study 
confirms what Mizrahi and Rosenthal uncovered in the original study and what Wolff 
confirmed – that internal financial resources are not necessarily an important factor in 
determining success for social change coalitions.  
$0 5 
$1-$50,000 2 
$51,000-$100,000 3 
$101,000-$250,000 4 
$251,000-$500,000 1 
$501,000-$750,000 3 
$751,000-$1 million 0 
$1.1 million-$2.5 million 3 
$2.6 million -  $5 million 2 
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When leader responses on internal coalition resources from intact versus dormant 
coalitions, differences in responses emerged. See Table 9 for a summary of the 
comparison. 
Table 9: Comparison of Internal Coalition Resources by Intact Coalition  
Leaders and Dormant Coalition Leaders *    
 Intact Coalition 
Leaders 
Dormant Coalition 
Leaders 
Diff. 
In-kind contributions  
100% 
50-99% 
 
6.2 
0 
 
28.6 
7.1 
 
22.4 
7.1 
Fundraising  
100% 
50-99% 
 
0 
6.2 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
6.2 
Member dues 
100% 
50-99% 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
Mean percentage difference 5.95 
   * Percentage of “yes” responses (N=30) 
 
Additionally, participants were also asked to provide, in dollar amounts, the operating 
budget for their coalition. When responses from the leaders of intact coalitions are 
compared to responses from the leaders of dormant coalitions, clear differences in 
responses between the two groups are apparent. See Table 10 on the following page for a 
summary of the comparison. 
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Table 10: Comparison of Operating Budget by Intact Coalition Leaders and 
Dormant Coalition Leaders *    
 Intact Coalition 
Leaders 
Dormant Coalition 
Leaders 
Diff. 
$0 0 46.2 46.2 
$1-$50,000 8.3 7.7 .6 
$51,000-$100,000 16.7 7.7 9 
$101,000-$250,000 25 15.4 9.6 
$251,000-$500,000 8.3 0 8.3 
$501,000-$750,000 16.7 7.7 9 
$751,000-$1 million 8.3 0 8.3 
$1.1 million-$2.5 million 16.7 0 16.7 
$2.6 million -  5 million 8.3 7.7 .6 
Mean percentage difference 21.0 
*Percentage of “Yes” responses 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, these findings show that intact coalitions, as compared to 
coalitions that went dormant, were less likely to rely on in-kind contributions and were 
more likely to have an operating budget. Furthermore, coalitions which are still intact 
more often had an operating budget of over a million dollars. This contradicts previous 
findings by Wolff (1993) who suggested that financial resources are not necessarily that 
important and that in-kind contributions can supplement for lack of financial resources.  
Leadership. Leadership remains a highly important factor in predicting coalition 
success, as many theorists, researchers and practitioners have posited previously 
(Balkundi & Kilduff, 2005; Burke et al., 2006; Burns, 1978; Chrislip & Larson, 1994; 
Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Hackman, 2002; Kozlowski, Gully, Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 
1996; Mattesich & Monsey, 1993; Mizrahi & Rosenthal, 2001; Rosenthal, Greenawalt, 
Ivery & Mizrahi, 2016; Wolff, 2001). Indeed, participant responses demonstrate that this 
continues to be true, as leadership ranked highest of all internal predictors, with a mean 
score of 4.72 (on a scale of one to five).   
Participants were asked to reflect to their particular leadership 
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qualities/characteristics and to “check all items that apply” to them as individual leaders: 
trained professional; came up from the ranks; proven credibility; trustworthy; uses the 
coalition to serve member organizations’ needs; opportunist; well connected to the 
external power structure; well connected to the constituency; organized; “good” 
manager; charismatic; visionary; “good” strategic political skills; “good” group 
facilitation skills; represents the coalition’s constituency; persistent; motivator; and 
agitator. Table 11 shows a summary of frequencies of responses to questions on 
leadership qualities.  
Table 11: Summary of Leadership Qualities  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Percentage of “yes” responses (N=30) 
 
These frequencies highlight that proven credibility, good group facilitation skills, being 
perceived as using the coalition to serve members’ needs, representing the coalition’s 
constituency, persistence, having gatekeeper access, being well organized and having 
good strategic political skills are of the upmost importance for effective coalition leaders. 
Good group facilitation skills 70.0 
Proven credibility 70.0 
Represents coalition’s constituency 66.7 
Uses coalition to serve members’ needs 66.7 
Persistent 63.3 
Gatekeeper 60.0 
Good strategic political skills 60.0 
Organized 60.0 
Trained professional 53.3 
Charismatic 53.3 
Good manager 53.3 
Visionary 53.3 
Motivator 50.0 
Trustworthy 50.0 
Came “up from the ranks” 46.7 
Well connected to external power structure 43.3 
Opportunist 36.7 
Agitator  33.3 
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These results confirm a number of previous findings. First, as Mattesich and Monsey 
(1993), Rosenthal and colleagues (2016) and Wolff (2001) confirmed, effective leaders 
must be able to facilitate group interaction and manage dynamic tensions between the 
coalitions. Leaders must also mediate and act as problem-solvers (Chrislip and Larson, 
1994) This process is strengthened by leaders’ structuring group interaction by specifying 
roles and expectations (Burke, et al., 2006, Kozlowski, et al., 1996, Rosenthal, et al., 
2016) and streamlining communication (Hackman, 2002; Mizrahi and Rosenthal, 1993; 
Rosenthal, Greenawalt, Ivery and Rosenthal, 2016) As one participant noted, “leadership 
has to be wisely executed [and] a person has to have some skill in bringing people 
together who may have different issues and facilitating a process where people are 
merged with a common interest.” Further, leaders’ statements expressing the importance 
of representing the coalition’s constituency and being perceived as serving members’ 
needs confirms what Dirks and Ferrin (2002) as well as Kaiser and colleagues (2008) 
suggest - members’ having a positive perception of the coalition leader(s) skill sets and 
attitude is important because this perception promotes member contribution and 
commitment. 
In addition to the structured Likert-type items, participants were asked if there 
were any other internal factors which predicted success in their coalition. Seven 
participants responded to this question and two participants stated that 
collaborative/shared leadership predicated success for their coalition. Further, when 
asked about “lessons” in coalition-building, only one participant stated that “coalitions 
have to have an appreciation for strong, shared leadership.”  
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This is a relatively low frequency considering the literature on collaborations 
suggests that leadership and power is shared in collaborative relationships (Avery, 1999; 
Joyner, 2000; Rosenthal, et al., 2016; Wolff, 2001). This finding may be explained by yet 
another dynamic tension that effective leaders must balance - the tension between product 
and process. In a traditionally hierarchical power structure, decisions can be made 
quickly. In collaborative partnerships, the process of reaching agreements takes more 
time. This finding suggests that leaders may forgo the collaborative process in favor of 
reaching decisions more efficiently.   
Participants were also asked to describe, in their own words, what other qualities 
or characteristics describe them as leaders. As respondents gave multiple answers, the 
number of responses exceeds the number of participants.  Of the 18 participants who 
responded to this question, 33.3% described themselves as a good listener, and three 
participants (16.7%) described themselves as relational, while another three described 
themselves as empowering. These qualitative findings confirm that relational and 
transformational aspects of leadership are of the utmost importance. As Burns (1978) 
noted, transformational leaders have the capacity to foster bonding relationships (Burke, 
et al., 2006; Kozlowski et al, 1996) which accumulate into a network. From a social 
capital perspective, the ability to grow a network increases the opportunities and access to 
social capital. Indeed, one of the structural predictors of social capital — creating a 
lasting network — was rated relatively high by participants at 3.96, on a scale of 1 to 5. 
Interestingly, participants rated being a visionary as relatively low, contrary to 
Mattesich and Monsey’s (1993) suggestion that effective leaders serve as visionaries for 
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coalitions. This discrepancy could be partially explained by general humility — in asking 
participants if they considered themselves visionaries, I found that many were reluctant to 
identify as such, perhaps believing it was too self-congratulatory.  On the other hand, as 
Wolff (1993) suggested, it is the members — not the leaders — who should serve as 
visionaries. By serving members’ needs and representing the coalition’s constituency, 
leaders were perhaps facilitating the visioning process without necessarily articulating it 
on their own accord. Again, it appears that leaders experience the dynamic tension of 
balancing the transactional and transformative aspects of leadership.  
Leaders from intact coalitions and dormant coalitions expressed different opinions 
about leadership qualities, as shown in Table 12.   
Table 12: Comparison of Leadership Qualities by Intact Coalition Leaders and 
Dormant Coalition Leaders *    
 Intact Coalition 
Leaders 
Dormant 
Coalition Leaders 
Diff. 
Good group facilitation skills 68.8 71.4 2.6 
Proven credibility 75 64.3 10.7 
Represents coalition’s constituency  75 57.1 17.9 
Uses coalition to serve members’ needs 68.8 64.3 4.5 
Persistent  56.3 71.4 15.1 
Gatekeeper 68.8 50 18.8 
Good strategic political skills 68.8 50 18.8 
Organized 68.8 50 18.8 
Trained professional 62.5 42.9 19.6 
Charismatic 62.5 42.9 19.6 
Good manager 56.3 50 6.3 
Visionary 56.3 50 6.3 
Motivator 50 50 0 
Trustworthy 75 64.3 10.7 
Came “up from the ranks” 56.3 35.8 20.5 
Well connected to external power structure 56.3 28.6 27.7 
Opportunist 25 50 25 
Agitator  43.8 21.4 22.4 
Percentage difference  14.7 
    * Percentage of “yes” responses (N=30) 
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As these findings show, participants from intact and dormant coalitions rate the following 
predictors of leadership as equally important: good group facilitation skills, acting as a 
good manager, and using the coalition to serve member needs. The similarities in 
responses to these questions are consistent with the previous findings on leadership 
qualities that are more likely to indicate success. 
Leaders from intact coalitions were more likely to describe themselves as using 
the coalition to serve members’ needs, to be well-connected to the external power 
structure and to be an agitator, consistent with previous findings on effective leader 
qualities. Ironically, leaders from dormant coalitions more often described themselves as 
persistent and as opportunists.  
Power and decision-making process. Theoretically, the decision-making process 
is an important variable in predicting coalition success (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972; 
Foster-Fishman et al., 2001; Speer & Zippay, 2005; Wells, et al., 2007), but type of 
process varied dramatically in this study.  When participants were asked to rate the 
importance of an equitable decision-making structure on a scale of 1-5, with 5 
representing high importance, their responses, in aggregate, averaged a rating of 3.68. 
Furthermore, when asked what factors help sustain commitment, 16.7% suggested that 
perception of decision-making power sustains member commitment.  Participants were 
also asked to describe the decision-making process within their coalition. Of the 29 
participants who responded, 11 participants (37.9%) described their decision-making 
process as collaborative/consensus, while 10 participants (34.5%) stated that their 
decision-making process was top-down. Five participants (17.2%) described their 
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coalition’s process as loose/informal while three participants (10.3%) described their 
decision-making process as a guided democracy. 
Participants from the original study were asked to offer “lessons” on coalition-
building. Of the 20 responses given to this question, six participants (30%) described the 
value of an inclusive, democratic process within the coalition. For example, one 
participant stated that “it’s not a vote – it’s a consensus. You have to be willing to spend 
time arriving at the consensus; otherwise, you’ll wind up with people who feel 
disenfranchised in the coalition and it’s not going to hold.” Another participant explained 
how “a leader without collective engagement and a real commitment to bottom-up 
participation may have all the charisma and great ideas, but it can’t be sustained, while 
another said “you have a better chance of reaching your goal if you function in a more 
democratic, respectful, inclusive way.”  
Some theorists have argued that democratic-decision making is optimal for 
collaborative relationships (Mattesich and Monsey, 1993; Wolff, 2001) and, in fact, 
coalitions with a history of successful democratic decision-making should be expected to 
have higher levels of social capital. Although the value for a collaborative decision-
making process is relatively apparent, coalitions and their leaders are not necessarily 
structuring this process into the coalition itself. Understanding how and why leaders 
forgo a democratic decision-making process is a theoretical and practical area that needs 
further exploration.  
When asked to rate equitable decision-making structure on a scale of 1-5, with 
representing high importance, participants from intact coalitions provided a mean score 
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of 3.78 while participants from dormant coalitions had a mean score of 3.58. Participants 
were asked to, in their own words, describe the decision-making process within their 
coalition. When broken into comparison groups of leader responses from intact versus 
dormant coalitions, differences in responses emerged. Table 13 shows the percentage of 
responses for each type of decision-making process in each sub-sample. 
Table 13: Comparison of Decision-Making Process by Intact Coalition Leaders and 
Dormant Coalition Leaders *    
 Intact Coalition 
Leaders 
Dormant Coalition 
Leaders 
Diff. 
Collaborative/consensus-based 31.3 42.9 11.6 
Top-down 37.5 28.6 8.9 
Loose/informal  6.3 28.6 22.3 
Guided democracy  18.8 7.1 11.7 
Mean percentage difference 13.6 
* Percentage of “yes” responses (N=30) 
 
Once again, there appears to be difference in the structuring of intact versus 
dormant coalitions, with dormant coalitions more likely to have an informal process. 
Quite interestingly, intact coalitions are more likely to have a top-down or “guided” 
decision-making process. This contradicts previous findings that suggest that successful 
coalitions are more likely to have a collaborative decision-making process. More research 
is needed to understand the value of all types of decision-making processes in coalitions.  
Coalition structure. There are a number of additional structural dimensions that 
contribute to coalition success, including operating structure, staffing, and coalition 
representation. When asked to rate items related to the structure of the coalition on a scale 
of 1-5, with 5 representing high importance, the mean response for participants good 
operating structure was 3.87 and the mean response for adequate staffing was 3.84. 
Indeed, the degree to which a coalition is structured and staffed and the degree to which 
 88 
organizations institutionalize membership appears to be an important predictor for 
predicting coalition success. In fact, of the fourteen participants who addressed the theme 
of how coalition membership was structured, thirteen participants (92.9%) described a 
preference for institution/agency-based representation. In other words, the coalitions that 
those participants were describing were comprised of organizations which had formalized 
the role of representative to the coalition. One participant explained that in her coalition,  
…the membership is a steering committee. One organization – which in this 
role has rotated throughout the years – takes the lead in having a hirable 
staff person of that organization serving in the role of facilitator, which is 
kind of a steering committee chairperson. 
 
Another participant described how formalized representation was preferred because, “any 
coalition that does not have much money and is not paying people essentially becomes a 
volunteer operation... and it’s extremely likely that people will drop away.” Another 
participant similarly expressed that “the problem is that everybody is paid staff in some 
[organization] and the coalition is not what they are getting paid to do.” Yet another 
participant believes that “you are going to be very hard pressed to find effective 
movements over time that do not have some professional, paid, permanent staff. In the 
modern world, stuff gets done when people are paid for it.” 
Only one participant of the 14 who addressed representation structure described a 
preference for a much looser, more informal representation structure, citing that 
“membership was fairly loose” and that they “would work with basically anybody”. Six 
participants referred to the degree of formal structure within their coalition and two 
mutually exclusive categories were created. Of the six participants who discussed this 
theme, five (83.3%) stated a preference for a formal structure. For example, one 
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participant stated that “organizational relationship and endorsement [are] important…. 
There has to be anchor institutions that are willing to invest some staff and/or financial 
resources into making, it, supporting it and getting it off the ground.” Another participant 
agreed that formally structuring the coalition gives it the best opportunity for survival, 
describing that in her coalition, they “were a permanent organization right from the start. 
That’s why we still survived.” A third participant referenced the Occupy Wall Street 
movement and suggests that “Occupy [Wall Street] was determined not to have a 
structure. They did not want to be a formal coalition with members and an agenda, so it 
was easy to knock them apart.” Only one participant of the 14 who referenced coalition 
structure expressed a preference for an informal structure, stating that in her coalition, 
“there was no operating structure. It was all willy-nilly, but it worked. It worked!”  
In fact, when participants from the original study were asked to offer “lessons” on 
coalition-building, 25% of participants described the need for greater structure within 
coalitions. One participant, for example, explained that “rules must be as clear as possible 
[and] coalitions need full-time people. Everyone needs to contribute and/or make a 
commitment, whether it be money, staff or capacity for demonstration.” Another 
participant describes “that frequently coalitions don’t necessarily have a clear structure 
for leadership or decision-making, so they fritter away.”  
The preference for a structured collaborative relationship and the overwhelming 
perception that this contributes to coalition success is consistent with Wolff’s (1993) 
suggestions and the idea that one organization would serve as an anchor institution is 
consistent with Rosenthal and colleagues’ (2016) suggestions. This type of arrangement 
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promotes clear roles and guidelines, which in turn, promotes participation and 
commitment of other members. Mizrahi and Rosenthal suggest, however, that coalitions 
create structure but allow for flexibility in participation. This dynamic tension is 
delineated further when participants were asked to describe in their own words, the 
benefits and drawbacks of becoming a permanent organization, and if that decision was 
made.  
Of the 15 participants who responded to this question, four (26.7%) said that one 
benefit to becoming a permanent coalition is increased legitimacy. Four participants also 
said that one benefit to becoming a permanent coalition is ability to secure funding 
directly. Three participants (20%) stated that a benefit to becoming permanent is 
increased agility to respond to issues, while another three stated that becoming a 
permanent organization means having a greater capacity to do the work.  
In terms of drawbacks to becoming a permanent organization, seven participants 
answered this question. Three participants (42.9%) stated that the greatest drawback to 
becoming a permanent organization is more bureaucracy while two (28.6%) stated that a 
significant drawback is that in becoming permanent, the organization is less flexible and 
responsive.  
When leader responses from intact and dormant coalitions were examined, 
differences in mean responses emerged. On average, participants from intact coalitions 
rated good operating structure at 4.18 (on a scale of 1-5, with 5 representing high 
importance), while participants from dormant coalitions rated it at 3.50 using the same 
scale. Adequate staffing, using a scale of 1-5, with 5 representing high importance, was 
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rated at 4.19 by participants from intact coalitions and 3.46 by participants from dormant 
coalitions.  
These interesting differences are consistent with the aforementioned discussion on 
coalition structure and the perception that greater structure increases the likelihood of 
coalition success. 
Participants were also asked to respond to questions about membership 
parameters. See Table 14 for a summary of frequencies of responses to questions on 
membership parameters.  The table indicates the percentage of participants who 
responded “yes” to the questions regarding membership parameters.  
Table 14: Comparison of Membership Parameters by Intact Coalition  
Leaders and Dormant Coalition Leaders *    
 Intact Coalition 
Leaders 
Dormant 
Coalition Leaders 
Diff. 
Members paid by coalition 56.3 42.9 13.4 
Dues 43.8 14.3 29.5 
Members volunteer 37.5 64.3 26.8 
Mandatory attendance 31.3 7.1 24.2 
No formal policy of membership 25 21.4 3.6 
Formal contract 18.8 0 18.8 
Commitment of specified resource  12.5 7.1 5.4 
Members paid by member organization 6.3 35.8 29.5 
Mean percentage difference  18.9 
* Percentage of “yes” responses (N=30) 
 
Again, these differences highlight the finding that greater coalition structure increases the 
likelihood of coalition success. As this table shows, intact coalitions were more likely to 
have members paid by the coalition, more likely to have mandatory attendance, more 
likely to have formal contract, more likely to commit a specified resource and more 
likely to require dues. These findings may be explained by the idea that members may be 
more likely to stay committed to coalitions when they invest time, resources and energy 
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into the coalition work. It also may be that when coalitions demand more formal 
membership, member organizations are more likely to institutionalize their representation 
in the coalition. Contrary to previous findings by Mizrahi and Rosenthal (1993), allowing 
for flexibility in participation may be to the detriment of the coalition. Conversely, when 
coalitions have higher expectations of their members, they are more likely to succeed.  
Leadership transition.  In addition to coalition structure and the decision-making 
process, there is an additional structural component that must be considered – leadership 
transition. From the analysis of the qualitative responses, three participants (30%) 
described success in effectively transitioning leadership. One participant describes in 
detail the time and energy it took to successfully make this transition: 
I had been at the [coalition] for 30 years and I said ‘I need my way out. The 
woman who ended up replacing me was working for me and I knew she had 
the skills to do this. I went to her and I said ‘Are you interested in having 
my job?’ and she said ‘Yes’. I said ‘OK – I want you to be joined to me at 
the hip for the next two years. You are going to know what I am thinking. 
You and I are going to do it together.  
 
This interesting finding suggests that more theoretical and practical attention needs to be 
paid to transitioning leadership. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, the inability to 
successfully transition leadership appears to be a strong predictor of coalition failure. It 
appears that effective coalition leaders structurally anticipate transitions in order to 
facilitate coalition success.  
Member contributions. Members were asked to rate shared responsibility within 
the coalition and equitable division of labor using a scale from 1-5, with 5 representing 
high importance. These two items garnered, on average, mean ratings of 2.56 and 2.50, 
respectively. In aggregate, these were the lowest rated items of all the internal predictors.  
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From the grounded theory data, 12 participants made reference to a small, highly 
active group of members who did the majority of the work. While not all participants who 
referenced this theme indicated a “magic number” that would make up this core group, 
those who did specified a relatively low number. For example, one participant stated “no 
more than three people did any of the work, but that was enough.” Another said they had 
“an executive committee of ten [people] that actually did the work”.  
In general, participants expressed a belief that a small, committed group of 
members could drive the coalition. One participant said that “there was a smaller core 
group compared to the larger coalition that would be composed of people that were most 
willing to stick with it and come on a regular basis” and another said that “our strength 
was that we had good, committed, core group”.  A third participant said “sometimes a 
coalition can work even when some of its members cannot or are not able to participate 
all the time. But I think the key members — that’s what’s critical. If key members of the 
coalition can hang together, I think that works.” This confirms what Mizrahi and 
Rosenthal found in their original study — and what they termed “commitment”. In other 
words, these finding suggest that coalitions do not need a large membership, if there is 
core group committed to consistently “doing the work”. Interestingly, the structural 
dimension of social capital — a small, tightly-bonded membership — was rated quite low 
at 2.61 (on a scale of 1-5, with 5 representing high importance). My supposition is that if 
this item had been phrased differently, i.e. “a small tightly-bonded working group”, it 
would’ve earned a much higher rating. In other words, the overall membership does not 
need to be tightly bonded as much as the key members who comprise the working group. 
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Participants from intact coalitions rated the importance of shared responsibility on 
a scale of 1-5 with 5 representing high importance at 2.77 while the average response 
from participants from dormant coalitions was 2.33. Participants from both intact and 
dormant coalitions rated equitable division using the same Likert-type scale at 2.5. 
Clearly, both groups rated the items related to member contributions relatively low, 
perhaps suggesting that both groups equally understand that value of a core, committed 
group of members over equitable distribution of responsibility throughout the entire 
coalition.  
Diversity. Diversity and inclusivity continues to be a complicated outcome to 
achieve and clearly merits more research. The literature is almost unanimous that 
diversity matters and is indicative of coalition success (Bayne-Smith, Mizrahi & Garcia, 
2008; Doll, et al., 2012; Mattesich & Monsey, 1993; Mattesich, Murray-Close & 
Monsey, 2001; Rog, et al., 2004; Rosenthal et al., 2016; Wolff, 2001). The findings from 
this study, however, are not as conclusive. Diversity, as a relational social capital 
predictor, was rated by participants at 3.46 (on a scale of 1-5, with 5 representing high 
importance). When asked to rate diversity, participants’ average response from intact 
coalitions was 3.64, while participants’ average response from dormant coalitions was 
3.25. 
Participants were asked to describe the demographic composition of their 
coalition’s working group to the greatest of their ability, including aspects of gender, 
race, education and socioeconomic status. In terms of gender, 19% of participants said 
that their group was an evenly mixed group of men and women. Just over 50% said that 
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their working group was comprised of mostly women, while 19% said that their group 
was mostly men.  
Of the 20 participants who responded to the question of race/ethnicity, twelve 
(60%) responded by stating that their working group was mostly white. Four participants 
(20%) said that their working group was “mixed” (Black, white, Latino). Three 
participants (15%) said their working group was mostly people of color (Black, Latino, 
Asian) while one participant (5%) said their working group was all white. 
Of the 15 participants who responded to a question of the educational level of the 
working group, seven (46.7%) said that their working group was “highly educated” 
(Masters degrees and higher) while seven (46.7%) said their working group was “very 
educated” (Bachelor’s degree). Only one participant said their working group was 
comprised of people who were high school educated.  
Of the ten participants who responded to a question on the socioeconomic status 
of coalition members, five participants (50%) said their group was comprised of mostly 
middle class individuals. Two participants (20%) stated that their working group was 
comprised mostly of working middle class individuals. One participant (10%) each said 
that their coalition’s working group was comprised of upper middle class individuals, 
wealthy individuals and working poor individuals.  
From the analysis of the qualitative responses from participants, 16 participants 
discussed the value of diversity when elaborating on other responses and four mutually 
exclusive themes related to the value of diversity were developed. Of the 16 who 
addressed this theme, six participants (37.5%) used coded or veiled language to 
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rationalize the absence of diversity within their coalitions’ working group. For example, 
one participant stated their coalition was “a white, middle-class organization with a 
tremendous commitment to racial inclusion and to addressing issues of discrimination, 
policies and programs.” Another participant stated that “there was a lot of awareness of 
and understanding of the fact that this group should be diverse”, while another participant 
said that they’ve “worked really hard to combine diversity with quality,” 
Three participants (18.8%) expressed a value of diversity but chose to forgo the 
“work” of inclusivity believing that by doing so, they would more easily and quickly 
reach their goal. For example, one participant explaining the underrepresentation of 
people of color in the working group, stated “I was very conscious of it and yet I didn’t 
want to gratuitously go down a level and look for additional people of color. It was a 
dilemma but I made that choice.” Another participant similarly expressed that 
“[Diversity] has been a major headache in the organization… as an Executive Director 
wanting to focus on programs, I’ve spent a lot of time trying to diversify and get people 
of color. Personally I can’t spend time on it anymore.” 
Another three participants (18.8%) expressed an explicit preference for 
homogeneity, rather than diversity. These participants straightforwardly stated that 
“diversity did not matter”, “coalitions are more successful when they are more 
homogenous” and “[in the coalition, the importance] of diversity is -10.” 
The final three participants (18.8%) who discussed diversity had an explicit 
preference for diversity and success in implementing in practice. One participant said that 
one of their coalition’s goals was “to bring diverse constituencies together for a shared 
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goal… [and] to create the broadest group possible — racial, ethnic and age balance too 
— across the board.” Another participant stated that their coalition “became more diverse 
over time and that as it grew, there was a recognition of the importance of becoming 
culturally diverse.”  
In sum, very few of the participants could claim that their coalition and 
specifically its working group was truly “diverse”, although most purported a value of 
diversity. This significant discrepancy needs further exploration but practically, it seems 
that Rosenthal’s “Inclusivity Checklist” is a helpful tool in assessing how well coalitions 
demonstrate inclusivity.  
Relationships: Respect, trust, communication and commitment. Understanding the 
complex interplay between respect, trust, communication and commitment is important in 
terms of understanding how relationships are developed and maintained and how these 
relationships develop into a successful network of collaborative partners (Bayne-Smith, 
Mizrahi & Garica, 2008; Burt, 1992, 2004; Butterfoss, 2007; Easterling, 2003; Mattesich 
& Monsey, 1993; Putnam, 2000). These variables constitute all dimensions of social 
capital — structural, relational and cognitive (Macke & Dilly, 2010; Putnam, 2000).  
Relationships are at the heart of successful coalitions. When participants were 
asked if there were any other internal factors which predicted success in their coalition, 
three of seven participants (42.9%) stated that good working relationships predicted 
success. Furthermore, from the qualitative analysis of open-ended questions, nine 
participants (64.3%) discussed the importance of developing and maintaining 
relationships within the coalition. As one participant states “you really need the interest 
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of everybody in the coalition. You really have to build relationships with everybody”, 
while another participant stated that “being a leader is about being relational… there is 
nothing more important than being relational” while another describes that “we needed to 
develop relationships with Directors or Assistant Directors [who were represented by the 
coalition].” Another participant stated that “coalitions are very relationship-driven” and 
that “[as a leader], a lot of my work was relationship-building.” 
Further, when asked for “lessons” on coalition-building, eight participants (40%) 
discussed the importance and quality of relationships within the coalition, with specific 
attention to the importance of respect, empathy and accountability. One participant, for 
example, stated that “You have to build relationships with everybody and you have to be 
able to respect people’s decisions without judgment” while another said that “you really 
have to listen to people. Everyone has to feel that they have input and that their ideas are 
being heard and implemented.” A third participant stated that “constant accountability is 
critical.”   
Participants were asked to rate the importance of mutual respect and trust 
amongst members using a scale of 1-5, with 5 representing high importance — an aspect 
of the cognitive dimension of social capital — and overall provided a relatively high 
mean rating of 4.27. Differences in sub-group comparison was minimal: Participants 
from intact coalitions rated mutual respect and trust amongst members at 4.21 while 
participants from dormant coalitions rated it at 4.33. Participants were also asked to rate 
the importance of clear channels of communication within the coalition using the same 1-
5 scale, which earned a mean rating of 3.58. Again, sub-group differences were minimal: 
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clear channels of communication were rated at 3.57 by participants from intact coalitions 
and 3.58 by participants from dormant coalitions. 
Additional cognitive dimensions related to commitment were examined. 
Participants rated members’ commitment to the coalition using a scale of 1-5 with 5 
representing high importance at 4.21 and rated members’ commitment to coalition goals 
at 3.69 using the same scale. Interestingly, members’ commitment to goals was rated at 
4.11 using the same Likert-type scale by participants from intact coalitions and 4.33 by 
participants from dormant coalitions. Participants’ from intact coalitions mean rating of 
the item members’ commitment to the coalition was 3.43 (on a scale of 1-5 with 5 
representing high importance), compared to a mean rating of 4.0 from participants from 
dormant coalitions. 
Providing tangible benefits to members was rated at 3.66 and providing intangible 
benefits to members was rated at 3.22.  Sub-group differences were once again minimal: 
providing tangible benefits to members was rated at 3.71 and 3.58 respectively, while 
providing intangible benefits to members was rated at 3.2 and 3.25 respectively.  This 
finding is quite interesting because as many previous theorists suggested, members join 
coalitions because they perceive that they will get something back (Leanna and Van-
Buren, 1999; Mattesich & Monsey, 1993; Watson & Papamarcos, 2002) and stay 
committed to coalitions because they actually do get something back (Wolff, 2001). 
Members’ commitment to coalition goals and providing tangible benefits are rated quite 
closely (3.69 and 3.66, respectively), confirming previous findings. Additionally, these 
findings confirm what Alexander and colleagues suggested — that commitment is 
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sustained to the degree that members can achieve their organizational goals through 
involvement in the coalition. Further, consistent with previous findings, communication 
and commitment to goals (3.58 and 3.69, respectively) are also rated quite closely, 
confirming that well-developed systems of communication affect commitment 
(Alexander, Comfort, Weiner & Bogue, 2001). Ultimately, these findings suggest that 
trust, communication and commitment are intertwined and perhaps that trust and 
commitment strengthen each other and are strengthened by each other through effective 
communication.   
From the question on “lessons”, five participants (25%) described the need for a 
shared commitment toward achieving goals. One participant said that “you got to really 
focus on the end product and not the process” while another said that “you have to be 
very committed” in coalitions in order for them to succeed. Similarly, a third participant 
said that it’s important to maintain “strategic focus on achieving results”.  
Participants were also asked to describe, in their own words, factors that sustain 
commitment to the coalition.  Of the 18 participants who responded to this question, six 
(30%) suggested that achieving visible successes helps to sustain member commitment. 
This is consistent with one of the themes — visibility through media — that emerged 
from qualitative of open-ended questions. In total, 20 participants addressed this theme. 
For example, one participant stated that “playing to the media is really critically 
important” while another describes how in his coalition,  
We had good media contacts, which was important, because what I learned 
was that you could have a demonstration with 1000 people but if the media 
didn’t report it, it never happened. It would have no impact. If the media 
picked it up, we could get somewhere. 
 101 
Another stated that “we did think it was important to be visible and get press coverage, 
get people to know we were out there and active, involving people in our movement” 
while another described how,  
Media is critical to us because we don’t have a lot of money. It’s one of the 
few ways to amplify our voice. If I get on a good media show, hundreds of 
thousands of people in NYC or nationwide can see us and hear our 
message. 
 
Of the 20 participants who addressed the importance of creating visibility through 
media, six (30%) explicitly stated the importance of doing so in order to leverage 
political power. For example, one participant said “we made government accountable 
[through media]. That doesn’t always mean we change their policies, but we are holding 
them accountable at least” while another participant describes how because of their 
visibility in media, “they [politicians] were calling us because they were looking for 
votes, but I also think because we were seen as a force that they needed to be at least 
connected to. The victories were visible.”  A third participant described how, although 
relationships with elected officials tended to be cooperative, “there were tensions, 
because there was always the concern that if they didn’t address this, we would come out 
in numbers and go to the newspaper and make a bigger stink out of the whole thing.”  
Ultimately, these findings suggest that relationships matter and that relationships 
are built upon respect, trust and communication. From social capital standpoint, 
relationships and their complex dynamics must be attended to for the sake of the 
coalition. It is through these trusting relationships that social capital is created and 
transacted. 
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CHAPTER 6: ENVIRONMENTAL PREDICTORS OF COALITION SUCCESS 
In order to succeed, coalitions must be able to learn from and adapt to its 
environment (Foster-Fishman et al., 2001; Mattesich & Monsey, 1993; Mizrahi & 
Rosenthal, 1993). They also must be able to meet the demands of various interest groups 
and gain resources (Ivery, 2007; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). The degree to which a 
coalition can thrive in its environment depends on a number of factors, including goal 
setting, identification of target and strategy, along with relationship with the community 
and degree of coupling as well as the greater political, fiscal and social climate. This 
chapter will highlight the findings related to the environmental predictors of coalition 
success.   
External Resources and Resource Dependence 
As Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) note, coalitions must be able to meet the demands 
of various interest groups in the environment in order to gain resources. Additionally, 
government and private funding is increasingly contingent upon the ability to collaborate. 
As such, external funding is becoming increasingly important for coalitions and other 
collaborative partnerships. In this study, participants were asked to breakdown the 
external coalition’s financial resources and allocate a percentage to each of the 
following choices, totaling 100: public funding; private funding; and sponsor 
organization. The following resources were identified as representing a majority of the 
coalitions’ resources (50% or greater). Four participants stated that 100% of their 
coalition’s resources came from private grants, while another three said that 95% came 
from private grants, while another three each said 80%, 60% and 50% came from private 
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grants, respectively.  One participant stated that 100% of the coalition’s resources came 
from public grants, while another three stated that 75% came from public grants. One 
participant stated that 100% of the coalition’s resources came from a sponsor 
organization.  
When the resources of leader responses from intact are compared to the resources 
identified by leaders from dormant coalitions, differences in responses emerged. See 
Table 15 for a summary of the comparison. 
Table 15: Comparison of External Resources by Intact Coalition Leaders and 
Dormant Coalition Leaders *    
 Intact 
Coalition Leaders 
Dormant Coalition 
Leaders 
Diff. 
Private grants 
     100% 
     50-99% 
 
12.5 
6.2 
 
14.3 
21.4 
 
1.8 
15.2 
Public grants 
     100% 
     50-99% 
 
0 
18.8 
 
7.1 
0 
 
7.1 
18.8 
Sponsor organization 
     100% 
     50-99% 
 
0 
0 
 
7.1 
0 
 
7.1 
0 
Mean percentage difference 8.33 
* Percentage of “yes” responses (N=30) 
 
It is clear that in instances where coalitions do secure funding, it is coming from 
an outside entity. Interestingly, coalitions which are currently intact are more likely to 
secure public money, while dormant coalitions were more likely to secure private money 
and/or funding from a membership organization. As Wolff (2001) suggested, coalition 
should find their environmental “niche” and seek out specific funding to achieve goals 
which fill that niche. Further research is needed to uncover specific sources of funding.  
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Goal-setting, Identification of Target and Strategy 
 Goal-setting and related variables should be considered as an environmental 
predictor of coalition success, to the extent that goals are outward-facing and targets are 
external. From a social capital perspective, the extent to which a coalition can bridge with 
others improves the chances of success (Bretell, 2005; Edwards & McCarthy, 2004). In 
the current study, participants were asked to respond to a question about the past (if 
dormant) or current (if intact) goals that the coalition addressed. Choices included: 
passing legislation; opposing legislation; influencing public opinion; electing public 
officials; defeating public officials; gaining funding; opposing funding cuts; creating new 
policies; opposing policy decisions; and other. All coalitions identified multiple goal 
types, all external.  Forty percent of participants said that at least one of their coalition’s 
goals were: passing legislation, defeating legislation, creating new policies and/or 
opposing policy decisions. One-third of participants said that at least one goal was 
influencing public opinion, gaining funding and/or opposing funding cuts.  
Further, participants were also asked to describe the target(s) of their coalition. 
Choices included: legislative body; elected leaders; public administration; court/justice 
system; specific community; specific constituency; and corporate/private entity. Of the 29 
participants who responded to this question, 19 (65.5%) stated that their target was a 
legislative body, while 12 (41.4%) stated that their target was an elected leader. Fourteen 
participants (48.3%) stated that their coalition’s target was public administration while 
three (10.3%) stated that the target was the court/justice system. Two participants (6.9%) 
stated that their coalition’s target was a specific community while five (17.2%) stated that 
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the target was specific constituency. Six participants (20.7%) stated that the coalition’s 
target was a corporate/private entity.   
When responses from intact versus dormant coalitions were compared, several 
differences in responses are apparent, as shown in Table 16.   
Table 16: Comparison of Targets by Intact Coalition Leaders and Dormant  
Coalition Leaders *    
 Intact 
Coalition Leaders 
Dormant 
Coalition Leaders 
Diff. 
Legislative body 68.8 57.1 11.7 
Elected leader 43.8 35.7 8.1 
Public administration  50.0 42.3 7.7 
Court/justice system 0 21.4 21.4 
Specific community 6.3 7.1 .8 
Specific constituency  25.0 7.1 17.9 
Corporate/private entity  18 21.4 3.4 
Mean percentage difference  10.1 
*Percentage of “yes” responses (N=30) 
 
An interesting finding that emerges here is that dormant coalitions were more likely to 
target the justice system while intact coalitions are more likely to target a specific 
constituency. It may be that some coalitions went dormant and/or did not achieve their 
goals because their target’s interest and power was in opposition to the coalition.  
Participants were asked to describe the strategies or tactics utilized by the 
coalition and were encouraged to “check all that apply” to the following: consensus 
through education; persuasion and/or collaboration; negotiation using incentives and/or 
threats; and/or conflict using demonstrations, civil disobedience and/or extra-legal. Of 
the 29 participants who responded to this question, 21 (72.4%) indicated that their 
coalition used consensus strategies. Specifically, 19 (65.5%) participants stated they used 
consensus through education strategies, while 16 (55.2%) stated that they used consensus 
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through persuasion strategies and 20 (69%) stated they used consensus through 
collaboration strategies. Thirteen participants (44.8%) stated that their coalition used 
negotiation strategies. Specifically, ten participants (34.5%) stated they used negotiation 
with incentives while eight (27.6%) stated they used negotiation with threats. Lastly, 17 
participants (58.6%) stated that their coalition used conflict tactics. Specifically, 13 used 
demonstrations, while three (10.3%) stated they used civil disobedience strategies and 
one participant (3.4%) stated that their coalition used extra legal tactics.  
Leader responses from intact demonstrated interesting differences from the 
responses of leaders from dormant coalitions, as shown in Table 17 below. 
Table 17: Comparison of Strategies and Tactics by Intact Coalition Leaders and 
Dormant Coalition Leaders *    
 Intact 
Coalition Leaders 
Dormant Coalition 
Leaders 
Diff. 
Consensus  
Through education 
Through persuasion  
Through collaboration  
75 
62.5 
56.3 
62.5 
64.3 
64.3 
50 
71.4 
10.7 
1.8 
6.3 
8.9 
Conflict 
Demonstrations  
Civil disobedience 
Extra-legal 
75 
50 
18.8 
6.3 
35.7 
35.7 
0 
0 
39.3 
14.3 
18.8 
6.3 
Negotiation  
With incentives 
With threats 
43.8 
37.5 
37.5 
42.9 
28.6 
14.3 
.9 
8.9 
23.3 
Mean percentage difference  12.7 
* Percentage of “yes” responses (N=30) 
 
Interestingly, coalitions which are still intact were significantly more likely to utilize 
conflict tactics, including all possible choices of demonstrations, civil disobedience and 
extra-legal actions. These differences will be discussed further in the section on 
relationships with targets. 
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Relationships and Degree of Coupling  
Theoretically, relationships with the community and the degree to which a 
coalition is entrenched in the community affects its chance of success. For example, As 
Aldrich (2006) notes, a loosely-coupled coalition has a lower level of collaboration with 
outside entities. Conversely, a tightly-coupled coalition tends to have a higher level of 
collaboration and influence. Clearly, relationships vary by entity as does the degree of 
coupling. 
Relationships with target. Participants were also asked to describe the 
relationship between the coalition and its’ primary target. Choices included cooperative, 
adversarial, reluctantly mutual and other. Of the 29 participants who responded to this 
question, 15 (51.7%) stated the coalition’s relationship with its targets was primarily 
cooperative, while 13 (44.8%) stated the relationship with target was adversarial. Nine 
participants (31%) stated that the coalition’s relationship with its target was reluctantly 
mutual. Nine participants chose other as their response, indicating that the relationship 
depended on the specific target and/or issue. 
Differences were discernible in the responses from leaders of intact coalitions 
versus dormant coalitions, as shown in Table 18. 
Table 18: Comparison of Relationship with Target by Intact Coalition Leaders and 
Dormant Coalition Leaders *    
 Intact 
Coalition Leaders 
Dormant Coalition 
Leaders 
Diff. 
Cooperative 50 50 0 
Adversarial  50 35.7 14.3 
Reluctantly mutual 43.8 14.3 29.5 
Other  31.3 28.6 2.7 
Mean percentage difference  11.6 
* Percentage of “yes” responses (N=30) 
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Interestingly, these findings show that intact coalitions are more likely to have adversarial 
and/or reluctantly mutual relationships, contradictory to the theoretical assumption that a 
more positive, bridging relationship would increase chances of success.  
When asked to rate the importance of choosing an appropriate target using a 
Likert-type scale of 1-5, with 5 representing high importance, participants assigned a 
rating of 4.18, with no difference between intact or dormant leader responses. From the 
grounded theory data, two participants described the importance of developing 
relationships with targets or opponents. One participant stated the importance of thinking 
long-term, stating “we’ve always tried to think about the fact that sometimes somebody 
who is a target can later become an ally” while another said “I get along well with 
everyone – even my opponents. I think that’s a really big part of being successful. I enjoy 
talking to people and learning about them.”  
From a social capital and network perspective, it is more desirable to be able to 
partner with targets and work cooperatively. The importance of relationships and the 
endurance of networks created out of those relationships increases the probability of 
future partnerships and goal achievement (Bronstein, 2001; Mattesich, Murray-Close & 
Monsey, 2001; Mizrahi and Rosenthal, 1993; Rog, et al., 2004; Wolff, 2001). Clearly, it 
is not always possible nor desirable, however, to work cooperatively, especially when 
coalition goals are in opposition to the interests of the target. Coalitions may also choose 
adversarial tactics in instances where they are attempting to change external power 
structures. Findings presented above contradict the theoretical assumption and instead 
show that intact coalitions are more likely to be in opposition to their target and more 
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likely to use adversarial tactics. Further research is needed to understand how coalitions 
are more likely to succeed given the more often oppositional nature of their relationships 
with target.  
Relationships with elected officials.  Elected officials may or may not also be 
targets of the coalition. Often, coalitions work cooperatively with elected officials to 
achieve goals without actually considering them a target. Overwhelmingly, 25 of 27 
participants (92.6%) stated yes, their coalition worked cooperatively with elected leaders 
and/or public officials, with minimal sub-group differences (87.5% and 92.9%, 
respectively). From the grounded theory data, eight participants (57.1%) discussed the 
importance of developing and maintaining relationships with entities outside the 
coalition, particularly with elected officials and other decision-making bodies. One 
participant states that “with [a former Commissioner] we used a personal relationship to 
establish as much good will as possible to get us in the door in a way that would allow us 
to at least have an audience.”  Another participant described the value of a personal 
relationship with elected and appointed leaders, describing, 
One of the young staff members – her sister was in the [State] Assembly 
and she knew absolutely everybody, so she introduced her sister to 
absolutely everybody. I mean – we would go out drinking with them – we 
had relationships! It wasn’t just in the Assembly – she knew everybody so 
that is how we started off having the ability to reach out to a lot of people. 
In one year, it turned out that one of my brother’s oldest, closest friends was 
writing the budget for the Assembly. I called him personally and asked him 
to put the language in, which he did. People change all the time. You 
constantly have to be building new relationships. 
 
Surprisingly, when asked to use a Likert-type scale to rate the importance of relationships 
with elected officials, participants assigned a value of 3.00, with sub-group ratings of 2.83 
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and 3.18, respectively. As compared to the other “relationship” predictors, participants 
rated relationships with elected officials highest. This makes sense, given that such a 
large percentage indicated that they do in fact work closely with elected officials. The 
relatively low rating assigned by the intact sub-group needs further exploration, as it 
seems that intact coalitions would place higher value on partnering with elected officials.  
Relationships with non-member entities. Nineteen of 25 participants (76%) said 
yes, their coalition worked cooperatively with other coalitions.  There were only small 
sub-group differences between leader responses from intact and dormant coalitions 
(68.9% and 57.1%, respectively). Twenty-four of 25 participants (96%) stated yes, their 
coalition worked cooperatively with organizations that were not part of the coalition, 
with only one leader from a dormant coalition answering “no”. Surprisingly, when asked 
to rate the importance of having working relationships with non-member individuals and 
having working relationships with non-member organizations using structured items 
from 1-5, with 5 representing high importance, participants in intact and dormant 
coalitions assigned the values of 2.21 and 2.11, respectively. These were the lowest rated 
items not only from the “relationship” predictor list but from the entire environmental 
predictors list. From the analysis of the qualitative data, three participants discussed the 
importance of developing and maintaining relationships with the constituency/community 
that the coalition intended to represent. One participant, for example, stated that “the 
constant accountability between [community] members and the coalition is really 
essential. The relationship-building part is critical.” 
 Further exploration is needed to understand how, overwhelmingly, coalitions 
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work with non-member entities, but value the importance of those relationships quite 
low, in terms of predicting success. From a social capital standpoint, this may be 
explained by the process of trade-offs. In other words, coalitions may not feel that their 
partnership is particularly valuable in terms of achieving a specific goal, but the value is 
in how they may benefit in the future.  
These findings are consistent with previous suggestions that coalitions are most 
likely to succeed when they are flexible in terms of coupling (Ivery, 2007, Thompson, 
1967); choosing to have long-term, deep relationships with some, and short-term, goal-
specific relationships with others. Further, the extremely high degree to which 
participants stated they have relationships with others is consistent with previous finding 
that coalitions firmly linked to the community have greater chances of success (Ibarra, 
Kilduff & Tsai, 2005).  
Historical Context  
 The political, fiscal and social climate surrounding the emergences of the 
coalitions under study gives us insight into the impetus and trajectory of each of the 
coalitions. In the 1970s, New York City was in turmoil, to state it mildly, and the impact 
of the varying crises that emerged at this time had lasting effects on the coalitions that 
developed and the populations they served. 
The city began running at a deficit in the early 60s, under then Mayor Robert 
Wagner’s direction. John Lindsay, who was elected in 1965, continued to finance 
municipal expenses through borrowing. The city’s relationship to the market remained 
strong, although the city was obligated to pay an interest premium on its debts, most of 
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which had been sold. When Abraham Beame took the mayoral office in 1974, an attempt 
to combat the fiscal crisis through a hiring freeze of city employees and further layoffs 
did not manifest, due to fear of retaliation by the powerful labor unions, and so financial 
problems continued (Dunstan, 1995). 
By 1975, the city had reached such a state of financial crisis - to the tune of $14 
billion in outstanding debt and an operating deficit of $1-2 billion — such that no one 
was willing to lend to the city. An advisory committee to Governor Hugh Carey 
recommended the creation of a state authority — the Municipal Assistance Corporation 
(MAC) — to oversee city finances and issue bonds to the city itself (Blumenthal, 2002). 
It also prepaid financial aid the city would receive during the fiscal year. Additionally, 
the state passed legislation that converted the city’s sales and stock transfer taxes into 
state taxes (Dunstan, 1995).  
Legislation (“New York State Financial Emergency Act of the City of New 
York”) was also passed that led to the creation of the Emergency Financial Control Board 
(EFCB). This law mandated that the city balance its budget within three years. This board 
had a great deal of power, including the ability to review and reject financial plans, 
budgets, union contracts and borrowing plans (Dunstan, 1995; State of New York, 2016).  
Late in 1975, the federal government stepped in, providing a $2.3 billion short 
term loan. Despite great reluctance, the federal government feared that should they not 
intervene, the looming bankruptcy of New York City would have a global impact. 
President Ford, over concerns that other public entities would seek federal public 
assistance, established conditions that made borrowing undesirable, including raising city 
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taxes by $200 million and forcing a number of politicians to resign. Despite the mandate 
that the city regain access to credit markets by 1978, the city was unable to do so. The 
federal government extended its financial aid under the condition that the EFCB extend 
indefinitely and be re-named the Financial Control Board. By 1979 the city re-entered the 
market and by 1982 was running the city on a balanced budget. By 1985, the city no 
longer required support from the MAC (Dunstan, 1995). In 1986, the “control period” of 
the Financial Control Board ended, although it continues to review the city’s financial 
plans to this day (State of New York, 2016). 
Although the city regained financial stability by the mid-80s, the impact of the 
financial crisis had long-lasting social repercussions. As the fiscal crisis reached a head, 
the city had become a place to avoid. Pamphlets stating “Welcome to Fear City” warned 
tourists of the perils of the city streets (Baker, 2015). By this point, the MAC had 
demanded that the city freeze wages, fire municipal employees, increase subway fares 
and charge tuition at city universities. City employment fell by 20% — police officers, 
fire fighters and teachers were fired. Wages dropped and raises were capped. (Dunstan, 
1995; Philips-Fein, 2013). Millions of “Fear City” pamphlets were distributed by the 
Council for Public Safety, a group of dozens of unions representing the uniformed 
services. These pamphlets warned that because of the freezes and layoffs, public safety 
personnel would not be available to protect residents and tourists. The bottom line: Stay 
away from New York. Although these fear tactics may be considered exaggerated 
responses, the truth was the crime — and in particular, violent crime — had been rapidly 
increasing from 1965 to 1975. As Baker wrote: 
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There was a pervasive sense that social order was breaking down. Most 
subway trains were filthy… The roads were in no better condition. Public 
restrooms were almost non-existent; dangerous and dirty when they were 
available at all. Times Square’s venerable old theaters and spectacular 
movie palaces were torn down for office buildings or allowed to slowly rot 
away. Countless storefronts advertised live sex acts, X-rated videos, 
books… Vandalism was incessant. Communities in each of the city’s 
boroughs were in advanced states of decay. The Bronx, which had been a 
bastion of desirable upper-middle-class living until the mid-‘60s, was now 
burning nightly; once magnificent apartment houses going up in flames lit 
by junkies or landlords looking to dispose of buildings they could no longer 
maintain. 
 
Throughout 1975, the unions and its members — those most affected by the cuts — 
continued to demonstrate and strike across the city, including a summer two-day strike by 
sanitation workers and a September weeklong strike by city teachers. By the end of the 
year, however; many of these groups agreed to cooperate with the city and recede in their 
confrontational tactics (Baker, 2015).  Even so, tensions simmered and in 1977, during 
the great summer blackout, 10,000 police officers refused to report for duty.  
By the mid-1980s, the social impact of the city’s austerity measures was apparent. 
Although the city was re-approaching financial stability, the quality of life for many New 
Yorkers had shifted dramatically. Municipal workers’ wages and pensions never 
improved while New York’s wealthiest continued to benefit from lower taxes, the 
elimination of the stock-exchange tax and record-low real estate taxes (Fitch, 1993). It 
was at this pivotal moment in the city’s history that the coalitions under study emerged.  
Political climate: New York City. Many coalitions developed during the tenure 
of Mayor Ed Koch (in office 1978-1989) and David Dinkins (in office 1990-1993). As 
one participant described, 
The [coalition] was founded by a number of organizations who had come 
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out and weathered the ‘70s fiscal crisis in New York City. The rationale was 
that throughout the ‘70s fiscal crisis, many organizations like those that 
founded the coalition really found themselves on the receiving end of 
budget cuts and policy changes.  
 
Twelve participants described the political climate surrounding these mayors, and those 
who followed, including Rudy Giuliani (in office 1994-2001) and Michael Bloomberg (in 
office 2002-2013). One participant noted that specific to his coalition’s issue of halting 
development, Koch was not particularly helpful, as “it was a pro-development type of 
administration.” Another participant echoed this sentiment, stating that “there was always 
pressure from these multi-millionaire development operations that essentially had the 
support of the city government.”  
A third participant, whose coalition was concerned with the maintenance of a 
hospital in Harlem, noted that specifically,  
Koch was extremely antagonistic… and that antagonism was something 
that developed during the coalition. He came into the office with a 
commitment to close the facility. That was one of his goals. His other 
political goal was to undermine the political strength of the Harlem 
community because the Harlem community had maintained its own 
political strength and influence within the city.  
 
Another participant described the shifting relationships with changes in administration. 
She noted, 
The politicians listened. Even under Koch, they listened. And Dinkins, of 
course - everyone was ecstatic to have him come in. Giuliani was brilliant 
in that his way of dealing with us was to never say a word. Giuliani was a 
death wish. Horrible man! I think he thought we were dirt. I think he 
probably knew we had a very small staff and small money and we had this 
voice, but he could ignore it. He was just not interested in all these [social] 
services. He wanted a “safe city”. He thought a safe city was through a 
police department and tough budgets. 
 
Another participant also described the changing political relationships, describing how, 
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David Dinkins was somewhat of a liberal and then it was Giuliani. Once 
Giuliani came in, that pretty much closed the door on any possibility of 
more of a support for our efforts from the city administration.  
 
Another participant echoes this sentiment regarding Giuliani, stating that, in terms of the 
issues of vacant property and housing, “Giuliani came in and it was clearly like selling it 
all off to the highest bidder.” Similarly, another participant stated that “when Giuliani 
came in in 1993, he took a wrecking ball to anything progressive.”   
One other participant stated that “we had a horrible relationship with 
Bloomberg… In general, we had a good relationship with the City Council because they 
tend to be more progressive.” Another participant also described the political climate not 
only as it related to the relationship with city mayors, but also with the city council. He 
noted, 
The political climate [was] always changing. It was the Giuliani/Bloomberg 
Republican era of the city. The city council was getting stronger. Back when 
we started the coalition, no one would invest. The only thing you could get 
was a borough president. You needed to convince two people in order to get 
something through one borough president because they all voted in a bloc. 
You needed one of three people – the mayor, the comptroller, and the city 
council president. Really you needed one borough president and one of 
those other three people and you had the votes you needed. It was a lot easier 
than it is now.  
 
Similarly, another participant described how with the Board of Estimates, it was easier to 
“get things done”. He noted that, 
 
In the old days, it was the Board of Estimates, so you had a few players to 
target on the city side. There were really only 5 or 6 people if you wanted 
to get city money. After the Board of Estimates was done away with, it was 
harder to get things done.  
 
One participant described how things have shifted since the late 1980s, stating that,  
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There was a charter commission. In those days, the city would just never 
pay the non-profits. They were very negligent in how they paid. They would 
wait months, sometimes years, to pay people. In the meantime, 
organizations would just go out of business because the city was just 
negligent in paying them. So in the 1989 charter revision we actually got 
provisions in the charter that require the city to pay non-profit vendors 
within a three-month period. Of course the city never followed it, but over 
time they’ve been trying to conform to the law. The Bloomberg 
administration – they would never follow the law and just scare people and 
sue them.  
 
One participant who described the political climate stated that “[city public officials] 
weren’t particularly helpful — there aren’t any city council members that I recall being 
particularly helpful.”  
Political climate: New York State. Seven coalition participants described how 
politics on the state-level impacted the work of their coalition, including the political 
climate under Governors Hugh Carey (in office 1975-1982), Mario Cuomo (in office 
1983-1994), George Pataki (in office 1995-2006), and Andrew Cuomo (in office 2011 – 
present). Participants also described how the political processes of the state legislature 
affected their work. 
 One participant described the relationship with both the Governors and other 
state-level officials. She noted that in 1980, 
Hugh Carey was Governor and there were new programs. He wanted to 
test his popularity – a way to save money if he doesn’t have to fund 
services. He didn’t have it in his proposed budget. The legislature put us 
back into the budget and Carey didn’t get to claim us – the legislature did. 
Carey didn’t [continue funding] the next year.  
 
She also stated that “it was easier in the Assembly than in the Senate. We ended up 
forming relationships with members — one was on the finance committee — who are on 
those committees and also with their staff.” Another participant described the relationship 
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with the state legislature, stating that, 
[Medicaid] policy – at least in New York state – is controlled by four 
people: the chairs of the Health Committee of the Assembly and of the 
Senate, the Speaker of the Assembly and the President of the Senate. 
Nothing happens without the approval of the chairs of those committees. I 
would say they get campaign contributions for the provider groups and they 
get elected. The 1199 union has a tremendous impact on elections, 
especially in New York City, so the Assembly is very pro-labor, both by 
principle – by being a democratically controlled body – and by the fact that 
their elections are often due to voter turnout by the union. The Senate is 
pretty much a moderate Republican group.  
 
Another participant described how things were most functional financially, under the 
leadership of Governor George Pataki. She noted that, “it was best with Pataki in terms of 
money but it was always up and down with the Governor.” Another participant, who’s 
coalition was concerned with Social Security benefits, described how, although the 
coalition has… 
… a pretty good relationship with Cuomo, it’s not a priority of the state 
government to increase SSI benefits and if anything, it should be a federal 
issue. The argument was that there were other poor populations out there 
that are doing much worse and if the state had money then they should be 
ones that are targeted first.  
 
One participant stated that overall, “in New York state, the political climate doesn’t 
change all that much.”  
 Political climate: Federal level. Five participants described how the politics at 
the federal level affected their coalition’s work. For example, one participant described 
how when Reagan was elected in 1980, he “immediately proposed a vast agenda to 
change the way government related to low-income people and working people. It was a 
very negative agenda. Extremely negative!” Another participant describes the challenges 
of starting “at the beginning of a rightwing shift in America, with the Reagan 
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administration.” 
One participant, who’s coalition was concerned with the issue of hunger, described how,  
[Although] hunger was a bipartisan issue, our percentage of guests who 
were welfare recipients – particularly at our food pantries and soup kitchens 
– has dropped pretty considerably. It was always a minority but now it’s a 
very small minority and that’s probably because of Clinton repealing the 
TANF [Temporary Assistance to Needy Families] in 1996. It’s much more 
difficult for poor women and children to receive Federal welfare assistance. 
 
He goes on further to state that because hunger is such a broad-scale issue,  
 
One of our goals is to have broad-based economic growth and to ensure that 
it creates more jobs and to ensure those jobs have a living wage. It’s really 
an international problem and certainly a national problem.  
 
Social climate. Sixteen participants described the social climate during the 
impetus and tenure of their respective coalitions. Participants described specifically how 
the social climate affected the specific population and issue their coalition was concerned 
with. For example, one participant, whose coalition was concerned with the health of gay 
men, stated that at the time their coalition developed (late 80s), “We were just learning 
about AIDS. People were still getting comfortable about coming out, being gay. AIDS 
was being defined as a White, gay disease or a Black drug-using disease”.  
Another participant described how particular to the issue of hunger, changes in 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) led to a social stereotype about welfare 
recipients. He stated that “It’s almost like they created a stereotype that Newt Gingrich in 
’95 was talking about which didn’t exist. They turned welfare much more into a 
stereotype.”  A participant whose coalition was concerned with teen pregnancy, stated 
that “it was a great time to be working in that field! It was a hot issue. Everybody wanted 
a piece of it, so everybody jumped in.” 
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Overall, seven participants described a shift in community engagement and 
commitment to collective action. One participant suggests that, 
You have to remember that this is coming on the tail end of the Black 
liberation struggle, the Civil Rights struggle, where people of color and 
Black people were saying, ‘we have self-determination.’  
 
Another participant described how when his coalition formed in the late 80s,  
 
We were part of a broader movement for neighborhood rights and housing, 
not just for upper class people but for lower and moderate income people. 
There was more involvement by the community and making decisions about 
the development issues.  
 
Another third described similar challenges that have emerged in the shifts in the social 
climate, stating that when her coalition formed, “it was a time when people were more 
interested in organizing, advocacy and lobbying.” Yet another participant described the 
shifting social climate, stating, 
1981 was a mere 10-15 years after the Vietnam and Civil Rights. So you 
had a lot of people that may have been interested in combating Reagan’s 
agenda, but they feeling was ‘oh we’ll hit the streets! We’ll just go out like 
we did in the ‘60s and ‘70s and overturn this!’ Well it didn’t happen and it 
couldn’t happen because people really didn’t know how to organize. What 
transpired was that there was literally no opposition to Reagan’s agenda as 
it affected poor people, working class people, people who had some 
vulnerability. What had also happened in the years between the ‘70s and 
‘80s was that the issues became more complex. It was policy, laws, 
regulations and many of them were very arcane. 
 
Consistent with previous findings (Mattesich & Monsey, 1993; Mizrahi and Rosenthal, 
1993; Rog, et al., 2004) it is apparent that the political, fiscal and social climate 
influenced the formation, functioning, duration and success of coalitions, and are critical 
in predicting coalition success, and as will be discussed in chapter 7 on coalition 
dissolution. Even in instances where coalitions did not have direct relationships with 
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elected officials, the policy decisions that were made affected coalition work. Further, it’s 
clear that political climate, on every level, affected the social climate, which in turn 
affected the work and outcomes of coalitions. 
  
 122 
CHAPTER 7: AREAS NEEDING ADDITIONAL RESEARCH 
This chapter will focus on findings in two research areas that require more 
research: predictors of coalition dissolution and changes in coalition leader responses 
over time. These findings are presented as preliminary because the data that emerged is 
suggestive and potentially important, albeit lacking robustness. In both instances, but for 
different reasons, more data is needed to complete a more comprehensive analysis.  
Predictors of Dissolution 
As the body of knowledge on coalitions and collaborations continues to grow, 
there remains a gap in the literature surrounding predictors of dissolution and/or failure in 
coalitions. This section will present preliminary findings on predictors of dissolution in 
social change coalitions.  
Initially, research and interview questions focused specifically around “failure” in 
coalitions. For the purpose of exploring predictors of failure, questions were developed 
for participants who considered their coalition to have failed. This was complicated by 
the fact that no participants considered their coalition to be a “failure” (this will be 
discussed in further detail later). After a number of participants indicated that their 
coalition had dissolved, but not necessarily failed, questions were eventually re-worded 
to explore how well internal and environmental factors predicted dissolution instead of 
failure. As a result, this sub-sample of participants (n= 6) is small because responses were 
not captured for all coalitions that had become dormant. Furthermore, although initial 
research was meant to capture predictors of failure, but instead captured predictors of 
dissolution, true predictors of failure remain an important subject for further research and 
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understanding.  
 Internal predictors of dissolution. Using a Likert scale of 1-5, with 5 
representing most important, participants were asked to rate the following internal 
factors in terms of how important they were for predicting failure/dissolution in their 
coalition [from this point, the term “failure” will be omitted from the discussion]: 
inadequate funding, inadequate staffing, loss of commitment to the coalition, personality 
conflicts, conflicts between staff and volunteers, incompetent leadership, inadequate 
leadership, inequitable decision-making structure, goal “drift”, diverging expectations 
among members, power imbalances, loss of accountability to constituency, inauthentic 
representation, and lack of trust. See Table 19 below for the summary of the mean 
scores. 
Table 19: Mean Internal Predictors of Dissolution Scores 
Inadequate funding 3.67 
Inadequate staffing 3.50 
Power imbalances 2.21 
Loss of commitment to the coalition 2.06 
Inadequate leadership 1.75 
Inequitable decision-making structure 1.56 
Personality conflicts 1.50 
Diverging expectations among members 1.38 
Lack of trust 1.29 
Inauthentic representation 1.13 
Incompetent leadership 1.06 
Goal “drift” 1.00 
Loss of accountability to constituency  0.94 
Conflicts between staff and volunteers 0.63 
* Items scored from 1-5, with 5 representing high importance (N=6) 
 
As can be seen from the table on internal predictors, all but inadequate funding and 
inadequate staffing received mean ratings below Mattesich and Monsey’s cutoff score of 
2.9 suggesting these are poor predictors. The two more highly rated items are consistent 
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with the findings on success related to resources and structure. In other words, 
participants from dormant coalitions suggested that lack of funding and staffing led to the 
dissolution of their coalitions. Contrary to previous literature which suggested that 
financial resources are not necessary (Wolff, 2001), especially when in-kind 
contributions are made, these findings confirm that resources are in fact a necessary 
component of coalition operation, as is some degree of full-time staffing.  
There was an additional finding, however, that emerged from the analysis of 
qualitative data. Seven participants spontaneously (70%) described the failure to 
effectively transition as a precipitating factor in their coalition’s dissolution. For example, 
one participant stated that “a lot depended on my leadership so when I stepped away, I 
think it hung on for another year or two but then frittered away.” Other participants 
conveyed similar experiences, stating “I’m not good at passing the reigns — I don’t 
really know how to do it. It just fell apart in a few years… I wasn’t really able to figure 
out who the next leadership person should be.” Another person described that “things 
started to unravel once I left. I guess to the extent that they didn’t really have anyone to 
replace me when I left that the whole thing started to unravel.” Another stated “I’m not 
saying I give myself credit, but I know it was a big loss when I left… then they lost the 
program.” 
This finding may be the most important internal predictor of coalition dissolution 
that emerged from this study. This finding suggests that structurally, leaders need to 
anticipate their departure (when possible) and create opportunities for new leadership to 
take over. Coalition leaders are compelled to do so because many coalitions are not 
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institutionalized, and as such, their role may disintegrate when they are no longer 
participating in the coalition.  
Interestingly, power imbalances was one item that received relatively high mean 
ratings. It may be that coalitions that did not persist once leaders departed were more 
likely to lack shared power and democratic decision-making. Logically, if a coalition did 
in fact have shared leadership and power, it could still effectively continue if one leader 
departed. Furthermore, from the findings on coalition success, it was apparent that 
leaders serve as a lynchpin for many other predictors, as they serve to create structure, 
define roles, streamline communication, and promote relationship-building. Once the 
lynchpin is removed, the related variables are affected. This finding is a promising start 
for further research on predicting dissolution in coalitions and on preventing dissolution 
when a coalition leader departs.  
Some additional suggestive findings emerged that inform our understanding of 
coalition dissolution. These findings come from a question on events in the coalition 
lifespan. These questions were not necessarily meant to capture leaders’ perceptions of 
coalition dissolution, as participants were asked to respond with a yes or no, simply, 
indicating if these events had occurred. When broken into comparison groups of leader 
responses from intact versus dormant coalitions, interesting differences emerged. See 
Table 20 on the following page for a summary of the comparison. 
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Table 20: Comparison of Events in Lifespan by Intact Coalition Leaders and 
Dormant Coalition Leaders *    
 Intact 
Coalition 
Leaders 
Dormant 
Coalition 
Leaders 
Diff. 
Coalition gained members 56.3 50 6.3 
Coalition lost members 50 28.6 21.4 
Coalition became a permanent organization 50 0 50 
Coalition went dormant then resurrected  0 14.3 14.3 
    
Coalition became a different coalition 12.5 0 12.5 
Coalition developed and addressed new goals 50 7.1 42.9 
Coalition changed mission 18.8 0 18.8 
Coalition became absorbed by a permanent 
organization 
0 0 0 
Coalition experienced mission drift  18.8 0 18.8 
Mean percentage difference  20.6 
* Percentage of “yes” responses (N=30) 
 
As this table shows, coalitions which later went dormant were far less likely to have been 
a permanent organization, again confirming that structure matters and more likely, that a 
lesser degree of structure indicates coalition dissolution. This table also shows that 
dormant coalitions were far less likely to develop and address new goals and to change 
coalition mission. These findings could be explained in a number of ways. First, it could 
be that coalitions which went dormant had no intention of lasting beyond the lifespan 
necessary to achieve a specific, time-sensitive goal. Once that goal had been achieved (or 
not), the coalition disbanded, as planned. This is consistent with the finding that longevity 
does not equal success and that coalitions are not meant to last. These findings could also 
be explained, however, by a lack of flexibility that eventually contributed to their 
becoming dormant coalitions. It may be that these coalitions could have persisted if they 
had expanded and/or adopted new goals and/or mission. Further analysis is needed to 
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uncover whether or not these dormant coalitions intended to last. 
Environmental predictors of dissolution. In addition to internal predictors, 
participants were asked to rate the following environmental factors (using a scale from 
1-5, with 5 representing most important) in terms of how important they were for 
predicting dissolution in their coalition: lack of influence in the community; community 
climate of competition; community climate of distrust; pressure/opposition from other 
constituencies; changes in political climate; co-optation; goal changes; target changes; 
and unresponsive target. See Table 21 for a summary of the mean scores for these items. 
Table 21: Mean Environmental Predictors of Dissolution Scores 
Lack of influence in the community  2.57 
Unresponsive target 2.57 
Community climate of competition  2.36 
Pressure/opposition from other constituencies 2.33 
Changes in political climate 2.14 
Target changes 2.00 
Co-optation 1.43 
Community climate of distrust 1.29 
Goal changes  1.14 
* Items scored from 1-5, with 5 representing high importance (N=30) 
 
Again, very few predictors even approached the cutoff of 2.9. Interestingly, lack 
of influence in the community and having an unresponsive target were identified as 
important predictors of coalition dissolution. Similarly, when participants were also asked 
to describe, in their own words, what other internal and/or environmental factors 
predicted dissolution for their coalition, four participants (40%) stated that feelings of 
mistrust/distrust by the community led to challenges within the coalition and the ultimate 
dissolution. These findings suggest that the sample size of participants who responded to 
these items is likely too small to make accurate claims, as community climate of distrust 
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was rated quite low, though 40% responded qualitatively and affirmatively along the 
same theme.  
Further, participants were also asked if, to their knowledge, there were any major 
political forces that directly contributed to the dissolution of their coalition, and if so, to 
describe that political force. Three responded with an affirmative, yes – two specifically 
noted that former Mayor Giuliani was the political force that drove them to dissolution 
while the third noted that former Mayor Koch was the political force that drove them 
toward dissolution. Additionally, when asked to describe any additional environmental 
factors that contributed to dissolution, two participants (20%) said that changes in the 
political/fiscal climate contributed to the dissolution of their coalition. Taken 
thematically, these findings of environmental predictors confirm that degree of coupling 
and relationships – with targets and the community – are important predictors of both 
coalition success and dissolution. 
Interestingly, community climate of competition was one item that approached the 
2.9 cutoff point suggested by Mattesich and Monsey (1993). This is consistent with 
Wolff’s (2001) previous suggestion that effective coalitions should assess the 
environment for other groups with similar and/or oppositional goals and that ultimately, 
coalitions should seek out their niche and develop goals within that niche. It appears that 
for at least some participants, these factors contributed to the dissolution of their 
coalition.   
These findings provide a suitable starting point for further research on coalition 
dissolution. These findings also confirm what Mizrahi and Rosenthal discovered in their 
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initial study – that regardless of whether or not goals were achieved, all participants 
considered their coalition to have been at least partially successful. Overall, more 
research is needed on coalition failure and subjective participant responses may not be 
the best way to study the phenomena. These preliminary findings do, however, inform 
our understanding of coalition dissolution.  
Preliminary Findings: Changes Over Time  
This section will include findings from questions where participants were asked to 
reflect on changes in their coalitions over time. It will also include a comparison of 
original participant responses from the original study versus the current study, where data 
are available to do so (N=22).  It will highlight how leaders define success over time, 
along with findings related to internal and environmental predictors of coalition success. 
These are considered preliminary findings, as at the time of analysis, responses were not 
obtained for all predictors.  
Changes in characterization of success. At the point of the original study, 80% 
of participants stated that their coalition was a total success, while 20% of participants 
characterized their coalition as somewhat successful. Of the original participants in the 
current study, 52.2% maintained that their coalition was totally successful while 47.8% 
stated that in hindsight, their coalition was only somewhat successful. Consistent with the 
original study, none of the original participants stated that their coalition was not at least 
partially successful. It is interesting to note, however, the shift in responses. Clearly, over 
time, participants adjusted their responses, with many who originally perceived their 
coalition under study to be totally successful now stating that their coalition was only 
 130 
partially successful. Because there are no longitudinal comparisons of this kind, it is 
difficult to make theoretical claims explaining this shift. Further research is needed to 
explore why these perceptions changed, although the following changes in definitions of 
success along with changes of internal elements impacting success inform our 
understanding. 
Changes in definition of success.  Although descriptive data for all participants 
was unavailable at the time of analysis, an overall ranking of choices was utilized to 
compare changes in responses over time. In the original study, the following predictors 
were most important in terms of defining coalition success (in order of importance): 
achieving goals, gaining recognition from target, gaining community support, members 
gaining new consciousness of issues, creating lasting networks, attaining longevity and 
lastly, members acquiring new skills.  
In the current study, original participants maintain that achieving goals is the most 
important definition of success, as it remains the highest rated item (4.29). An additional 
item was added to the new questionnaire - community gaining new consciousness – and 
this is now rated as second most important reason (4.0) along with gaining community 
support (4.0), followed by creating lasting networks (3.9). Following creating lasting 
networks, gaining recognition from the target dropped in ranking (3.86), and is now 
followed by members learning new skills (3.67), which is viewed more important than 
when previously studied. Members gaining new consciousness received one of the lowest 
importance ratings (3.5), only above longevity (3.05). The most dramatic shift to occur 
was in creating lasting networks, which is now seen as more important. This finding 
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informs our understanding of not only how coalition success is defined and measured but 
also in how it is operationalized. As will be discussed further in Chapter 8, this finding 
suggests that coalitions may be best conceptualized as networks, not necessarily 
organizations.  
Changes in perceptions of internal elements impacting success. As 
aforementioned, descriptive data from the original study was not available at the time of 
analysis, although a summary the ranking of indicators was. Participants in the original 
study identified a number of internal factors that impacted success in their coalition. 
Commitment to goal/cause was identified most often, followed by competent leadership, 
commitment to coalition, equitable decision-making structure/process, mutual respect, 
achieving interim victories, and shared responsibility. Adequate funding was identified 
less often, as was good operating structure, equitable division of labor, and past history 
of working relationship. Right connections and contacts was identified least often.  
Of the items that were addressed in both the original and current study, there were 
some shifts in ranking. In the current study, competent leadership (4.84) was identified as 
most important, followed by members’ commitment to coalition goals (4.38); mutual 
respect and trust (4.35); and achieving interim victories (4.25). The next rated item was 
good operating structure (3.93), followed by members’ commitment to the coalition 
(3.85); adequate funding (3.79); and equitable decision-making structure (3.79). Having 
the “right” connections and contacts (3.73) was rated next, followed by history of 
positive working relationship (3.34); equitable division of labor (2.65); and shared 
responsibility (2.45). As can be seen, a couple structural elements are now perceived as 
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more important: good operating structure and adequate funding, consistent with previous 
findings.  
Interestingly, an equitable decision-making structure is now perceived as less 
important, as is shared responsibility. This data supports previous findings that shared 
power and decision-making is not necessarily desired nor being implemented in coalition 
practice. Taken thematically, these findings confirm that a core group of key members 
can effectively maintain a coalition and its work to achieve goals. Further research is 
needed to uncover more on how these perhaps more traditionally hierarchical 
mechanisms are being valued and practiced in coalitions whose goals are often full 
community participation. Further examination is also needed to understand how and why 
leaders at least partially define coalition success by the ability to mobilize communities, 
but in practice seem to more so value having a smaller, less inclusive group of leaders 
getting the work done. These apparent discrepancies may have a more nuanced 
explanation – namely, that effective coalitions require a small, committed group of key 
members to achieve goals except when large-scale visible demonstrations or movements 
are desired.  This unique longitudinal analysis of changes in perceptions of coalition 
success is interesting and ongoing and will continue as data becomes available.  
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CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
This chapter will focus on key findings from this study, including a discussion of 
how coalitions should be operationalized and their success defined, along with the related 
internal and environmental predictors predicting their success. This chapter will also 
discuss research limitations and complexities in addition to areas for future research and 
policy implications.  
Key Findings: A Revised Understanding of Coalition Success 
This section will discuss how key findings inform our understanding of how 
coalition success is defined and how coalitions should be operationalized in research. 
Further, this section utilizes key findings on internal and environmental indicators to 
refine our ability to predict coalition success and includes a revised list of coalition 
variables that should be taken in to consideration when studying coalitions.  
Defining coalition success. One of the most interesting findings from the original 
study was learning that success was defined multi-dimensionally. In the original study, of 
greatest importance for participants was that the coalition achieved its goals. In the 
current study, this remained the greatest predictor of success for both original and new 
participants, as well as for participants from intact and dormant coalitions. The high 
frequency of this response was apparent in both quantitative and qualitative responses.  
Interestingly, responses from the original participants changed over the interim 
25+ years between studies. Whereas in the original study, gaining recognition from the 
target and gaining community support were indicated the most important definition of 
success following achieving goals; in this study, original participants stated that having 
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the community gain new consciousness and gaining community support were identified as 
important definitions of success, again following achieving goals. Longevity remained the 
least important definition of success for original participants.  
There were also interesting differences in defining success in responses of 
participants from intact versus dormant coalitions. Most significantly, participants from 
intact coalitions rated members gaining new consciousness much higher, in addition to 
members learning new skills. Perhaps unsurprisingly, participants from intact coalitions 
rated longevity much higher, as compared to participants from dormant coalitions. 
Differences in responses were less pronounced when comparing responses from original 
versus new participants.  
When asked to define success in their own words, the most common response 
given was that bringing people together was the greatest predictor of success, above 
achieving goals. Goals, in this sense, were the explicit goals of the coalition. Most often, 
these goals were passing legislation, defeating legislation, creating new policies and 
opposing policy decisions. One quarter of participants in this study stated that their 
coalition had not achieved its primary goals and, overwhelmingly, participants said that 
their coalitions’ goals did not change over time.   
Coalitions as networks. Coalitions rely on the continual enactment and exchange 
of social capital because member commitment is contingent upon the actual exchange of 
capital preceded by the establishment of trust. Every member or organization does not 
benefit all the time but there has to be a belief that each one will at some point. The idea 
of “solidarity struggle” becomes vital here — members agreeing to fight someone else’s 
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fight under the belief that the same manpower will be available to them when a more 
personal issue is on the table. Commitment and participation decline when reciprocity is 
not demonstrated. People and organizations participate as long as their own interests are 
met and/or they trust that their interests will be met in the future.  
Trust cannot develop without good working relationships both in and out of the 
coalition. However, as many participants noted in the qualitative responses, there does 
not need to be a large group of active members; there just has to be “enough” people 
doing the work – a tight core of committed participants driving the work.  As the 
qualitative responses indicated, visibility in media is of great importance in terms of 
sustaining the work of the coalition. As participants noted, the media does not necessarily 
take note of an action or event without the numbers behind it. From a social capital 
perspective, this indicates that the bonding component of social capital is important to get 
the work done, while the bridging component becomes important when it’s time to 
mobilize and create large-scale, visible actions. 
One important conclusion from this study is that coalitions should be 
conceptualized as networks more so than as an organization of organizations. I suggest 
that coalitions be defined as networks of autonomous entities who, through collective 
action, exchange social capital in their mutual pursuit of internal and/or external goals. 
Coalitions are held together by “weak ties” as demonstrated by the tenuous nature of 
individual representation in a coalition. The individual or organizational representative 
acting as the “weak tie” also serves as the conduit through which the exchange of social 
capital (and ultimately the exchange of other forms of capital) takes place. Ultimately, the 
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efficacy of a coalition should be measured by the endurance of the network that was 
created more so than the endurance of the specific coalition — success is indicated by 
longevity of the network more so than longevity of the coalition itself.  
Internal predictors of coalition success. This study confirmed many aspects of 
previous studies examining internal predictors of coalition success. In particular, this 
study confirmed that impetus to form and the related purpose of the coalition is 
important, as this predictor affects a number of additional variables, including leadership, 
goals and resources. Internal financial resources should be considered, especially as it 
relates to the ability to staff a coalition.  
Additionally, leadership – including style and approach – is highly important, as 
leaders structure collaboration, specify roles and expectations and streamline 
communication. Effective leaders are also relational – creating and fostering relationships 
by acting as mediators, problem-solvers and group facilitators. Further, leaders promote 
the development of social capital, including member contributions and commitment by 
being perceived as serving members’ needs. This study highlighted that successful 
coalition leaders balance transactional and transformative leadership skills and make 
strategic choices about sharing power and structuring the decision-making process.  
Coalition structure emerged as an important predictor of coalition success. 
Specifically, findings from this study demonstrated that a more formally structured 
collaboration contributes to coalition success. Moreover, there appears to be a preference 
for institutional representation in coalitions as well as higher, more structured 
expectations of members, as these dimensions are more likely to increase commitment. 
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Anticipating and structuring leader transition also emerged as an important finding. 
In terms of member contributions, it appears that participants believed that 
coalition success is not contingent upon broad-based commitment. Instead, success relies 
on the commitment of a small, core group of committed members. Overall, the value of 
relationships is an important predictor of coalition success, as the interrelated 
components of respect, trust, commitment and communication affect the development of 
social capital as well as overall coalition success. Additionally, diversity is one internal 
predictor that appears to be important in terms of coalition-building, but to what extent 
remains unclear.  
Environmental predictors of coalition success. In terms of environmental 
predictors of coalition success, this study highlighted the utility of external resources and 
resource dependence in terms of predicting coalition success. Furthermore, this study 
confirmed that to the extent that goals are outward-facing, goal-setting, identification of 
target and strategy should be considered as environmental predictors. Additionally, 
findings from this study suggest that relationships and the degree of coupling between 
the coalition and the community should be considered.  In particular, relationships with 
targets and/or elected officials are important predictors of success, as are relationships 
with non-member individuals, organizations and coalitions. Lastly, findings from this 
study confirmed that the political, fiscal and social climate affects coalition success.  
 Refined list of variables for coalition success.  Cumulatively, findings from this 
study lend themselves to the development of a more refined list for understanding 
coalition success. This refined framework is as follows: 
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Internal Predictors of Coalition Success 
1. Impetus to form and coalition purpose 
2. Goal-setting, identification of target and strategy 
3. Internal resources 
4. Leadership 
5. Power and decision-making  
6. Coalition structure 
7. Member contributions 
8. Diversity 
9. Relationships: Respect, trust, commitment and communication  
Environmental Predictors of Coalition Success 
10. External resources and resource dependence  
11. Goal-setting, identification of target and strategy 
12. Relationships with community and degree of coupling 
13. Political, fiscal and social climate  
 
Future researchers would benefit from using this more nuanced framework to study 
coalitions and other similar forms of collaboration.    
Limitations and Complexities  
 
This study contributes to the body of knowledge on coalitions in a meaningful 
way. There are however, a number of limitations and complexities inherent to the study 
design and methodology.  
Internal and external validity.  One of the major limitations is the issue of 
internal validity and the ability to “predict” or make causal claims. Participants were 
asked to self-report on their perceptions of predictors of coalition success and 
failure/dissolution. Because this study was designed purposefully to capture practice 
wisdom and knowledge of practitioners, it did not employ many “objective” 
measurements. This design decisions means that true causal claims cannot be made, only 
perception of cause.  
A secondary design complexity is that in an attempt to replicate a significant 
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portion of the original study and make comparisons between the same participant 
responses over time, much of the same questionnaire was utilized from the original study. 
However, a significant fraction of the original participants could not be recruited for the 
current study. This shift in sampling means that those aspects of the original study were 
not truly replicated, as the same participants did not participate in both studies.  There is 
also an issue of external validity, as the uniqueness of the study and the aforementioned 
complexities should be factored in when making generalizations beyond the current 
study.    
Reliability. The concern for reliability is complicated by the choice to ask 
participants to self-report. This is especially complicated for the sub-sample of original 
participants. Many of these participants had not participated in their coalition for years 
and some admittedly had cognitive challenges with recall. This certainly adds a layer of 
complexity to the study. Furthermore, there is the issue of missing data, in that there was 
one interview recording that was completely garbled and other recordings which had 
brief moments of illegible audio. Although detailed notes were taken on the questionnaire 
itself during interviews, some information was lost in these low fidelity recordings.  
Scope and measurement. Additionally, there was the issue of scope of the 
research. As discussed earlier, the sample size of this study is too small to do more than 
descriptive analysis. There also was a challenge related to the instrument itself. There 
was some lack of clarity in questions themselves, especially as it related to the sub-
sample of original participants. There was some confusion as to whether the participants 
should be reflecting on the coalition they represented in the original study or coalitions 
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they’ve participated in as a whole. Ultimately, I clarified that they should think 
specifically about the original coalition they represented, although there is a great deal of 
knowledge in asking them to reflect on coalitions as a whole and this is a potential 
opportunity for future research.  
Future Research Opportunities   
This study contributes to the body of knowledge around coalitions and their 
success. In the process, it confirmed a number of previous findings and created 
opportunities for future research and exploration. My most imminent future research 
pursuits will include additional analysis from the original data in order to create more 
longitudinal findings around changes in perceptions over time. Future research should 
consider coalitions from a network and social capital perspective.  
Thematically, this study highlighted a number of complexities that warrant further 
research. These themes are power and inclusivity; leadership; relationships; and the 
effects of the political and social climate. Additionally, this study emphasized the need 
for further research on coalition dissolution and failure.  
Power and inclusivity. Overall, the sample of participants was almost equally 
split between identified male and identified female. The entire sample was predominately 
white, and even more so of the sub-sample of new coalition leaders. As a whole, coalition 
leaders were highly educated across a variety of disciplines. It could be suggested that the 
group of participants from the original study were reflective of the identities of the 
original researchers, who are both white, highly educated women. Because the original 
sample was predominately a “reputational” sample, its somewhat unsurprising that the 
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sample mirrored that of the researchers, to a certain degree. This suggestion is 
complicated, however, as the sample of new coalition leaders, while similarly educated, 
were predominately white women. Again, this could be at least partially explained by the 
fact that I am a white, highly educated woman and that the participants from new 
coalitions, whom I recruited, may have been more comfortable agreeing to participant 
because of the similar identities. In other words, the coalition leaders who did NOT 
respond or did not agree to participate in my study may reflect a more diverse group, in 
terms of race and gender.  
This demographic data as a whole could also be explained at least partially by the 
historically exploitative relationships between researchers and marginalized people and 
communities, suggesting again that those who chose NOT to participate may have been 
reflective of a significantly more diverse group. Those who were not represented in the 
sample may have been exercising self-determination in refusing to participate in 
institution-based research.  
It is likely, however, that the overrepresentation of white individuals in the sample 
is also explained by the fact that those recruited are considered “leaders” and hold high 
positions in the coalition itself and/or in the member organization which is represented. 
Further, when asked to describe their working groups, participants most often said that 
their group was mostly women, mostly white and mostly highly educated. This is 
interesting given that with few exceptions, the coalitions represented in the study served 
marginalized populations. It’s also quite interesting given that when asked to describe the 
work of their coalitions, the most highly indicated response was “to promote community 
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participation”, yet less than 15% of the “working groups” in the coalitions represented 
included community members with just one coalition’s working group was comprised 
strictly of community members. Additionally, when asked for their lessons on coalition-
building, a number of participants described the value of an inclusive, democratic 
process. 
This issue of diversity and inclusiveness emerged as a theme in the qualitative 
analysis. Most commonly, participants rationalized the absence of diversity within their 
coalition while many others explained why the challenges of creating an inclusive 
coalition created such a “headache” (in one participant’s words) that those coalitions 
made an explicit choice to forgo the work toward inclusivity. Another common response 
was to state an explicit preference toward a homogenous group, under the belief that the 
coalition could more quickly and efficiently achieve its goals. Only three participants 
described success in creating an inclusive coalition that was representative of the 
population it was serving.  
One might expect this level of racial disproportionately in corporate America — 
for example, in 2014, just over 4% of Fortune 500 CEOs were people of color and overall 
there have only been 15 Black CEOs in Fortune 500 companies. Moreover, only 6.7% of 
“management” jobs in the nation are held by Black persons, despite making up over 
twice that share of the larger population (McGirt, 2016). It is somewhat counterintuitive 
and perhaps disappointing that social change coalitions dedicated to community 
participation and eradicating forms of oppression would not be more representative of the 
constituencies the member organizations and greater constituencies they are serving. 
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Creating a coalition that is both productive, diverse and representative remains a 
challenge. Many participants discussed the tradeoffs of forgoing diversity for a perceived 
efficiency that results from a homogenous group. The value of diversity in both corporate 
America and in the non-profit world needs further, deeper exploration, including how 
implicit and explicit biases influence the thoughts and decision-making around 
inclusivity. It is understandable that coalitions are under enormous social and financial 
pressure to achieve their goals. It is also clear that the “dynamic tensions” that emerge in 
creating and balancing diversity is a significant challenge for many coalition leaders. 
While it may be true that coalitions can more quickly achieve their goals without 
diversity or full community participation, what is lost in the process of essentially 
excluding those who are supposedly being served? Moreover, what are the intricacies that 
lead to the creation (or lack thereof) of a diverse coalition? Specifically, how do 
mechanisms of privilege and oppression impact the creation and maintenance of a diverse 
coalition? Ultimately, in our increasingly global and diverse society, it will become even 
more important for coalitions and organizations to examine best practices on inclusivity 
and implement these accordingly. Future research on social change coalitions should 
focus on synthesizing these best practices and analyzing barriers to implementation.  
Leadership in coalitions. Overall, leadership qualities and approach persist as 
extremely important in determining coalition’s success. Leaders serve as the linchpin for 
many other internal and environmental predictors. Leaders ultimately facilitate the 
transaction of social capital within the coalition, by helping to articulate the greater vision 
and goals of the coalition and create opportunities for members to participate and feel 
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valued.  Effective leaders provide opportunities for relationship-building within the 
coalition and the subsequent development of trust and commitment. Leaders also 
facilitate communication and the decision-making process and dictate the degree of 
inclusiveness and the “direction” of decision-making (top-down versus bottom-up). In 
this sense, both transactional and transformational leadership styles are valued within 
coalitions. Future research should focus more specifically on the attributes of coalition 
leaders from this theoretical perspective, with particular attention to building best 
practices on inclusive leadership. Future research should also focus on building models of 
successful leadership transition.  
Relationships: The building blocks of coalitions. Relationships emerged as a 
prominent theme in a number of ways. A vast majority of participants stated that their 
coalition had relationships with elected officials, other coalitions, and other 
organizations. Qualitative responses indicated that participants highly value building 
relationships both within and outside of the coalition. Future research could focus more 
in-depth into how these relationships are cultivated and maintained, both during the time 
of a coalition’s particular existence but also once coalitions go dormant or dissolve.  
Effects of the political, fiscal and social climate on coalition success. The 
coalitions under study emerged during a time of great social and political distress in New 
York City and this not only shaped the impetus to form, but the direction and 
maintenance of the coalitions presented here. As participants highlighted, relationships 
with elected officials matter and it was clear that the relationships with city-level officials 
was of the utmost importance. Most participants found the relationship with former 
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Mayor Koch to be challenging and the relationship with former Mayor Giuliani to be 
particularly antagonistic.  
Despite many of the coalitions being focused on local issues and populations, the 
political climate on the state level also influenced the coalitions. Many coalitions sought 
funding for themselves or the populations they served and politically, these choices were 
made on the state level. In addition to developing relationships with Governors, many 
coalitions had to appeal to the State Assembly and the State Senate in order to secure 
resources.  
According to participants, the national political climate impacted the coalitions 
under study in the sense that the national agenda set the stage for the state-level agenda. 
Additionally, the way social issues were articulated on the national level often framed 
how issues were received locally. In other words, the national political climate most 
greatly impacted the local social climate, in many instances.  
The greatest lesson learned here is that political climate matters as does 
relationship-building with officials and bodies on all levels. Local government seems to 
most influence the actions of the coalition, while state government seems to most 
influence funding. Federal political climate matters to the extent that it shapes the social 
climate on the local level. Future research on coalitions should take into account the 
political and social context within which the work of the coalition is taking place. It 
would be interesting to make comparisons across locales, both in terms of other large, 
urban cities and in rural coalition-building.  
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Coalition failure and dissolution. As mentioned previously, 25% of participants 
in the current study stated that their coalition had not achieved its primary (explicit) 
goals, yet no participants identified their coalition as total failure, consistent with the 
original study. Furthermore, only two of the internal predictors of dissolution were rated 
above 2.9: inadequate funding and inadequate staffing. None of the environmental 
predictors were significant in predicting dissolution, according to leaders. 
Interestingly, although rated a 1.29, community climate of distrust was the most 
commonly articulated reason for dissolution when participants were asked to describe in 
their own words why their particular coalition failed. Many participants also articulated 
that challenges that arose during leadership transition ultimately led to the demise of the 
coalition. Further, when asked to describe if there were any political forces that 
contributed to the dissolution of their coalition, three participants said yes, even though 
changes in the political climate was also rated relatively low.  
The relatively low ratings of both the internal and environmental predictors of 
coalition success, along with the inconsistencies in the quantitative and qualitative 
responses, indicate that our framework for understanding coalition failure is weak. This 
may be explained by a variety of factors. First, the terminology being utilized may not be 
effectively capturing the full experience of coalition dissolution. Questions in both the 
original study and the current study focused on factors leading to failure and/or 
dissolution that had a somewhat negative connotation (i.e. inadequate funding, 
incompetent leadership, lack of trust). Neither study adequately captured reasons for 
dissolution that were positive — i.e. goal achievement. Coalitions may disband if they 
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have achieved their goals, yet this was not examined in either study.  
The inconsistencies in between quantitative and qualitative response may also 
indicate that coalition participants do not fully understand the reasons that their coalition 
dissolved and/or that the way the questions were posed did not allow participants to 
clearly articulate their experience. There is a major opportunity for future research on 
predicting coalition failure and dissolution and two potentially separate experiences. At 
this point, it is premature to make explanatory and certainly causal claims about either 
experience. Future research should approach coalition failure and dissolution from a 
descriptive and exploratory framework.  
Implications for Professional Social Workers  
Coalitions allow social workers at all levels to advocate for, elevate and advance 
the needs of their clients. For social workers who provide direct service, coalitions 
provide an opportunity to share information and collaborate, allowing workers to refine 
and improve practice. Social workers at the administrative level gain much from 
participating in coalitions, also because they can learn from others, but also because 
coalitions provide an opportunity to learn about the impact of their work from 
perspectives they may not typically be exposed to. Social workers who are doing macro-
level policy work are especially likely to benefit from coalition participation. As 
partnering with varied professional and organizations increases, so does the likelihood of 
exercising political influence. This study provides insight into the working mechanisms 
of coalitions and the predictors of success, allowing social workers to advance their goals 
at all levels of practice.  
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Social workers are compelled to be agents of social change. By choosing to be 
part of an interdisciplinary team, as is often the case with coalitions, social workers have 
the opportunity to influence social change targets, but also other fields of practice. By 
involving themselves and their organizations in coalitions, social workers have the 
potential to provide other professionals with social work-specific knowledge and values, 
including the person-in-environment perspective and the emphasis on social justice. In 
addition to advancing the goals of coalitions and targets, this also creates a possibility to 
advance the social work profession, by providing a public forum to articulate the specific 
abilities and skill sets of social workers.  
Lastly, this study examined perspectives from leaders with a great deal of 
experience and will provide a context for those experiences. The knowledge gained from 
this study has the potential to advance the movement of evidence-based practice. By 
refining the models created by Mattesich and Monsey, and that of Mizrahi and Rosenthal, 
this study will contribute to the knowledge base of social change coalitions. 
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